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INTRODUCTION
The struggle between making progress and preserving tradition
is as old as time.1 On the one hand, progress is needed to move
forward, to grow, to expand, to become more prosperous, and—
perhaps most importantly—to prevent being left behind.2 On the
other hand, tradition is what links society to its past, gives a sense
of history and roots, and creates a common culture that binds
everyone together.3 In the context of legal reform, how does one
move a legal system forward, yet still maintain the institutions that
make such a system so unique?
In many ways, tradition and reform are natural adversaries. The
former calls for a preservation of the known, of the familiar, and of
the steadfast, while the latter calls for a questioning of the status
quo and skepticism about the current state of affairs. A given
country’s long-standing legal institutions bring about a sense of
comfort and predictability and engender a feeling of expertise and
common knowledge. Often times these traditional legal concepts
come about due to the particular history, characteristics, and
experiences of the people who have lived in the locale over time.4
1. See generally Jiang Chang & Feng Jun, The Contemporary Conflict of
Values § 1 (Paideia Project, Twentieth World Cong. of Philosophy, Working
Paper, 1998), available at https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuChan.htm,
archived at https://perma.cc/X9SC-GDBG.
2. See, e.g., Progress and Tradition Struggle to Mix in Cambodia,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b
/14f3128f-837b-44f3-b5db-88f520c50f10, archived at http://perma.cc/3X4K3QWU.
3. See YVES CONGAR, THE MEANING OF TRADITION 8–9 (A.N. Woodrow
trans., Hawthorn Books 1964); PASCAL BOYER, TRADITION AS TRUTH AND
COMMUNICATION: A COGNITIVE DESCRIPTION OF TRADITIONAL DISCOURSE 3–6
(1990).
4. See Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional
Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 27 (2014) (describing the influence of
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As such, the legal tradition of a place is intimately bound up in the
very culture and spirit of its people. Historical laws create a sense of
community such that those who belong to the community may be
readily identified, and those who are outsiders are disadvantaged
and kept at a distance.
Legal reform, on the other hand, plays quite the opposite role.
It challenges the historical and the traditional in a quest to find the
new and the better. Reform is often undertaken when traditional
institutions prove to be out-muted or inefficient in the face of
changing economic, cultural, or political forces.5 Further, reform
often accompanies larger regional or global movements toward
uniformity or harmony among various laws—particularly in the
commercial context.6 As such, legal reform seeks not to maintain
the divide between those on the inside and those on the outside, but
rather to break down barriers such that persons have equal
opportunities and a level playing field from which to operate and
interact.7
But legal reform never happens in a vacuum.8 As lawmakers
engage in the process of revising, amending, or completely
overhauling a given set of laws, the process is heavily influenced
by psychological and sociological undercurrents, which can
frequently operate at a subconscious level.9 While the intent may
be to replace or supplant a given area of the law with a completely
new system, the innate pull of the past and the powerful influence

history in the interpretation of American constitutional principles); see also
Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 42–
44 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Is the Wisconsin State Constitution
Obsolete? Toward a Twenty-First Century, Functionalist Assessment, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2007).
6. See generally Franco Ferrari, General Principles and International
Uniform Commercial Law Conventions: A Study of the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention and the 1988 Unidroit Conventions on International Factoring and
Leasing, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 157 (1998); see also Scott J. Burnham,
Perspectives on the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 603,
604–05 (2001).
7. See John McClaugherty, The Uniform Law Process: Lessons for a New
Millennium, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2002); see also John
Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE
L. REV. 1387, 1394–96 (2003); Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing
Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 176–77 (1998).
8. See generally Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A
New Role for Courts?, 91 YALE L.J. 827 (1982) (discussing the role of judges in
reforming outmoded statutes).
9. See infra Part IV.A–B and accompanying discussion.
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of tradition often pervade and inform the legal reform process.10
An unwillingness to surrender traditional institutions which have
been such an important part of the history and culture of a given
jurisdiction can weaken, hinder, or even thwart good-intentioned
efforts to revise and reform the law to make it more modern and
efficient. Thus, in order to engage in truly effective legal reform in
any particular area of the law, it is necessary to understand the role
that tradition and history can play in influencing the lawmaking
process so as to ensure that reforms are done in a way that creates a
truly clear, competitive, and coherent body of laws that reflect the
public policy goals of the people.
This Article is concerned with the tradition–reform dichotomy
as it exists in certain jurisdictions that, because of their unique
history and nature, are particularly susceptible to the struggle
between legal tradition and legal reform—mixed jurisdictions. In
order to more closely examine this struggle and its theoretical and
practical effects, this Article analyzes the role that traditional legal
institutions play in the law reform process through the lens of
America’s lone mixed jurisdiction—Louisiana—and how this
struggle results in an anchor-like legal conundrum.
Through an exploration of Louisiana’s subtle, yet prevalent,
anchor effect caused by the struggle between progress and
tradition—the process of mooring one’s self to existing institutions
to such a degree that newly adopted institutions are rendered less
effective and the law as a whole suffers—one is able to extrapolate
as to how traditional and historical forces play a role in the much
larger sphere of mixed jurisdictions globally. This investigation is
accomplished by analyzing two major commercial law concepts
that have been the subject of the collision between legal reforms on
the one hand and the maintenance of existing civil law institutions
on the other. Specifically, this includes reviewing the interaction
between the civil law’s traditional warranty of condition in the sale
of property—redhibition11—and its interplay with the American
Uniform Commercial Code’s similar concept—the warranty of

10. See infra Part IV.B.
11. See generally DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES §§
11:1–11:48, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012) (Redhibition is a civil
law-based, Louisiana-specific legal institution dealing with the warranties
provided by sellers to buyers relative to the condition of the thing sold.); 1
PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10:82 (2d ed. 2006)
(distinguishing redhibitory defects from restrictions on use); Elizabeth A.
Spurgeon, Comment, All for One or Every Man for Himself? What is Left of
Solidarity in Redhibition, 70 LA. L. REV. 1227 (2010) (providing a historical
account of redhibition under Louisiana law).
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fitness.12 Also, Louisiana’s quasi-adoption of the common law
doctrine of unconscionability in contracts is explored against the
backdrop of one of Louisiana’s traditional civilian institutions of
contractual vices known as lesion beyond moiety.13 Lastly, this
Article explores the broader social science and psychological
aspects behind this anchoring effect by exploring society’s inherent
desire to hold on to traditional customs and practices, and to resist,
even if only subconsciously, certain change.14
Through an understanding of these Louisiana legal concepts
and institutions—sometimes identical, other times opposing—and
their interplay, one gains a better recognition and understanding of
the anchor effect and its negative consequences, particularly in the
commercial law realm, on all mixed jurisdictions. And through
such an understanding, mixed jurisdictions are better able to
structure their laws so that their public policies with respect to
commercial viability and competitiveness are furthered and in
harmony with—rather than frustrated, undercut, or anchored down
by—their traditional and historical institutions.
I. AMERICA’S LONE MIXED JURISDICTION—LOUISIANA
Although this Article explores the legal tradition–reform
struggle in Louisiana in order to extrapolate the anchor effect’s
impact on mixed jurisdictions worldwide, it is essential that one
have a general understanding and appreciation of the nature and
history of mixed jurisdictions. It is through an appreciation of the
distinctive condition, history, and culture that informs the law
making process in these unique locales that one can perceive how
acute the struggle between tradition and reform can be in the
bijural experience.
A. An Overview of Mixed Jurisdictions
Although no official definition exists, the preeminent Scottish
comparative law scholar Sir Thomas Smith described mixed
jurisdictions as those that are “basically a civilian system that had
been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law and
has in part been overlaid by that rival system of jurisprudence.”15
In America, Louisiana clearly fits into this dichotomy, but so do
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part IV.
VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE
THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 7 (2d ed. 2012).
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many other countries, the legal foundations of which are built on
the civil law, but because of force, necessity, or time have been
built up with common law institutions.16 Some of these betterknown localities include South Africa, Scotland, Israel, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and Quebec.17
Understanding the features of what makes a country a mixed
jurisdiction is essential to appreciating its susceptibility to the
anchor effect.18 The noted civil law and comparativist scholar
Vernon Valentine Palmer describes mixed jurisdictions as exhibiting
three principal “lowest common denominator” characteristics.19 The
first involves analyzing the mixture itself.20 Although it is true that
the law of every country is influenced by a myriad of factors such as
religious doctrine, Roman law, and custom, only in mixed
jurisdictions is a significant body of the country’s law derived solely
from the civil law and common law systems.21 In this way,
Professor Palmer directs the analysis toward a sort of threshold
requirement—the mere influence of multiple facets and aspects of
various laws on the country’s legal system is not enough, but rather
a fundamental portion of the law must originate from these two
major legal traditions.22 The second characteristic is more abstract
and involves the subconsciousness and psyche of the mixed
jurisdiction.23 Professor Palmer distinguishes countries that merely
transplant legal concepts from one tradition to the other from mixed
jurisdictions that exhibit a certain cognizance about their bijurality.24 In
a mixed jurisdiction, there is a general affirmative acknowledgement by
the legal community that the law of that country represents a fusion of
common and civil law concepts.25 The third and final trait is the law’s
structure.26 In a mixed jurisdiction there will generally be a walling
off of certain areas of the law and a sort of demarcation as to which
system dominates.27 For instance, the private law—which includes
the law of persons, delicts, family, property, and importantly for these
purposes, contracts—will be substantially civilian in appearance and

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 7–10.
Id. at 13.
See id. at 13–14.
Id. at 8–11.
Id. at 8.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9–10.
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order.28 On the other hand, public law in such a jurisdiction—
comprising the separation of governmental functions, the role of
the judiciary, and constitutional rights—will be led by the English
tradition.29
Much like with Louisiana, many mixed jurisdictions acquired
their bijural character through a series of intercolonial transfers
between traditionally civil law countries (such as France and
Spain) and countries that were dominated by the common law
(such as Britain and the United States).30 That is not to say that
when a traditionally civil law country came under the control of a
common law government that a change or mixing of legal systems
was a forced or even immediate event.31 On the contrary, many
times the change and mixing came gradually.32 For instance,
Quebec was ceded by France to Great Britain at the conclusion of
the Seven Years War in 1763.33 Puerto Rico and the Philippines
came under United States control after the Americans defeated
Spain in the Spanish-American War.34 After such conquests or
annexations, the new governments would often impose traditional
common law structures in the area of public and criminal law, but
leave the civil law in place to be more gradually assimilated.35 This
was done, in large part, for political reasons as the imposition of a
new system of private law in largely non-Anglophonic populations
could prove disastrous and disrupt public order and stability.36
Instead, the strategy for a more slow and steady integration was
adopted.37 It is through this gradual assimilation of common law
concepts into the private civil law system of mixed jurisdictions
that the right conditions were created for the anchor effect to arise
and take hold.38
This Article focuses on the anchor effect’s impact on
commercial law because, both historically and in modern times, it
is the area of the law that is most susceptible to the tradition–
reform struggle.39 As briefly discussed above, the maintenance of
the civil law in the area of private transactions can be best
28. Id. at 10. See generally STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING
(Esin Örücü et al. eds., 1996) (exploring the structures of mixed jurisdictions).
29. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 10–11.
30. See id. at 25.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 26.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 27, 29.
37. Id. at 27, 79–81.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 79.
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described as a means to keep the peace and stability of a newly
conquered or annexed country.40 Instead of imposing the common
law upon all private matters immediately, a more gradual
assimilation was favored.41 Maintaining existing commercial laws,
at least for the time being, served a particularly useful purpose for
these colonial powers.42 Commercial laws are those that govern the
everyday interactions of private individuals.43 The very economic
viability of a country—from the purchasing of food and goods to
the selling of wares—is rooted in its commercial laws.44 The
importance of these constructs is even more evident when viewed
through the lens of colonial mercantilism, which sought in many
ways to strengthen the economic might of the parent country by
utilizing the resources of its colonial holdings.45
So although mixed jurisdictions acquired their unique bijural
personalities through their colonial experiences, it was specifically
their commercial viability—either for their merchant and maritime
successes or their lucrative natural resources—that made these
areas attractive to colonial powers to begin with.46 Because a
country’s commercial strength or potential held such a prominent
place in what made it so desirable for conquest, it is natural that the
civil law institutions governing such commerce would be held dear
by its people. Further, the people of these conquered or annexed
countries were typically mistrustful of their new rulers and displayed
a strong desire to hold on to their cultures and traditions,47 and the
law of the marketplace was an obvious object for such affinity.
Thus, this area of private law was a natural anchoring point for these
newly subjugated societies—as all other semblances of selfgovernment and control were pulled away and replaced with
colonial, public law structures. Thus, maintaining the private law

40. Id. at 26–27.
41. Id. at 27, 79–81.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See id.; see also Michael J. Stepek, The Importance of Commercial Law
in the Legal Architecture of Post-Conflict “New” States, 60 ME. L. REV. 487,
497–502 (2008) (discussing the importance of commercial law in nation-state
building).
45. See GUSTAV SCHMOLLER, THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM AND ITS
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 57–59 (W.J. Ashley ed., London, MacMillan & Co.
1896).
46. See, e.g., PHILIP J. STERN & CARL WENNERLIND, MERCANTILISM
REIMAGINED: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN AND ITS EMPIRE
(2013).
47. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 27–29.
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then in place was a way to feel a sense of self-preservation and
permanence.48
As for the early common law rulers of these mixed
jurisdictions, they would find it more politically expedient to allow
existing commercial laws to remain in place since the dominant
social groups of the area had such strong cultural ties to them.49 The
calculation was often made that the invisible hand of the larger
regional, continental, or global marketplace would eventually push
away existing civilian commercial institutions to make room for
more dominant common law concepts.50 As Professor Palmer notes,
the assimilation of common law or more mainstream commercial
concepts did not come from outside forces, but from internal
business interests desiring to align the country’s economy more
closely with prevailing commercial practices.51 Thus, just as
discussed below in the case of Louisiana, it was self-interest and
economic motivation that gave birth to the incorporation of foreign
legal concepts into the traditionally civil law sphere of these
jurisdictions.52
In reviewing this interaction and gradual, but voluntary,
assimilation, one can easily see how the symptoms so common to
the anchor effect could arise. First, each country was allowed to
keep an area of the law that was culturally and historically its own,
despite the fact that the new colonial power was substituting
common law structures for the domestic public laws then in
place.53 Because this one area was allowed to remain, it would
serve as a natural source of pride and attachment for the country.54
This is particularly true since the area of commercial law is chiefly
concerned with the livelihood and economic prosperity of the
country and its people.55 However, by the same token, prevailing
commercial practices—either of the governing country or of the
region—would be brought to bear on the idiosyncratic nature of
the existing civil law institutions.56 For instance, South Africa, a
country that is historically civilian in nature, would feel the
48. Id. at 26–27.
49. See id. at 27–29.
50. Id. at 79–81.
51. Id. at 81.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 26–27.
54. See generally Sylvia Wairimu Kang’ara, Beyond Bed And Bread:
Making The African State Through Marriage Law Reform—Constitutive And
Transformative Influences of Anglo-American Legal Thought, 9 HASTINGS RACE
& POVERTY L. J. 353 (2012) (describing the struggle of Africans under colonial
rule when faced with the invalidation of their customary law-based marriages).
55. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 79–81.
56. Id.
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economic impetus to fashion its laws to more closely resemble the
laws of Great Britain, which historically dominated the global
commercial marketplace.57 Similarly, Puerto Rico and the Philippines
would also feel the need to adapt to the commercial practices of its
American rulers whose economic influence infiltrated commercial
and business transactions worldwide.58
In sum, the human tendency to anchor one’s self to the familiar,
the traditional, and the well-known is powerfully exemplified in the
experience of mixed jurisdictions. Through this dichotomy it is easy
to see how, in the legal reform process, efforts would inevitably be
made to keep certain traditional laws in place even when similar,
duplicative, or even conflicting new laws were enacted. This
would seem particularly true given the strong desire of conquered
countries to retain aspects of their law that had long enjoyed strong
cultural significance.59 The unique and singular nature of mixed
jurisdictions—representing a stand-alone holdout of the civil law
tradition, yet encircled by prevailing common law forces—makes
them all too susceptible to the anchor effect. As discussed below
through the lens of Louisiana’s bijural experience, this ever-sosubtle effect can lead to the enactment of a scheme of laws that
attempts to fulfill two goals—a preservation of tradition and a
desire to create a more clear and competitive body of laws—but in
the end achieve neither.
B. The Louisiana Bijural Experience
A great deal of Louisiana law is derived from the civil law
tradition,60 whereas the rest of the United States follows that of the
common law.61 Because of its unique status, legal scholars have
often declared that Louisiana is a civil law island floating in a sea
of common law jurisdictions—a mixed jurisdiction.62 Going back
to its early history, Louisiana adopted and was chiefly influenced
by the French (and some argue equally so by the Spanish) civil
law.63 In fact, many provisions of today’s Louisiana Civil Code
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 85–86.
Id. at 26–27.
See A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PROPERTY § 6, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 10–11 (4th ed. 2001).
61. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (Steve Sheppard ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 4th ed.
2010).
62. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 80–81.
63. See generally Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts
and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV. 628, 634 (1972) [hereinafter
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still resemble complimentary provisions in France’s Code Civil as
enacted in 1804.64 Louisiana scholars view its legal system as
unique and as something to be treasured, rather than as mere relics
of the past.65
At various times in its long history, Louisiana has waged
several long, hard-fought battles to maintain its civilian identity.66
In 1803 when the United States first took possession of the
Louisiana territory, the then-existing laws consisted of French and
Spanish laws and legal customs that were derived from the
territory’s former colonial rulers.67 At the time of annexation by
the United States, the territorial Superior Court—in order to
Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808]; Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 7–8
(1971) [hereinafter Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808]; Robert A. Pascal,
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV.
603, 605–07 (1972); Joseph M. Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over the
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585, 590–91 (1972).
Although not entirely resolved, academic fervor over this dispute has faded from
view. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical
Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 97, 100–03
(Haas, ed. 1983) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law]; Shael
Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum
Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (1996); Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A
Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV.
12, 40 (1937); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, The Anomalous Interaction of
Code and Statute—Lessor’s Warranty and Statutory Waiver, 88 TUL. L. REV.
423 (2014).
64. See, e.g., Pitre v. Pitre, 183 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. 1966) (noting that
“Article 891 of the French Civil Code . . . is the same as our Article 1408”); see
also Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 313, 316 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (“The
provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 2190 are substantially the same as those contained
in Article 1273 of the French Civil Code.”); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of
Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of Owners, 43 LA. L. REV. 57, 63
(1982) (“Article 728 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 was the same as article
52 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and article 689 of the French Civil
Code.”).
65. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana
Supreme Court: Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful Legal
Tradition, 74 LA. L. REV. 649 (2014) (extolling the virtues of the civil law); see
also John H. Tucker, Jr., The Jurisconsult, 45 LA. L. REV. 1011 (1985) (“Tucker
initiated a movement at Louisiana State University for the creation of an
Institute devoted to legal research and law revision. In his words, the civil law
was historically a body of law expounded by jurisconsults, a university made
law, and a hope for the preservation and expansion of the Louisiana legal
tradition depended on the development of an indigenous legal scholarship.”).
66. PALMER, supra note 15, at 260–64.
67. A great deal of debate exists regarding whether it was actually French or
Spanish law that predominated the law of Louisiana at the time. See generally
Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law, supra note 63, at 96, 100–03.
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solidify the civil law’s continued use despite the state’s new
American masters—stated that “Roman, Spanish, and French civil
law would be enforced as the customary law of the territory in all
cases.”68 This was followed by an act of the Louisiana Legislative
Council and House of Representatives that affirmed the sentiments
of the Superior Court in upholding Louisiana’s existing civil law
institutions.69
However, Governor W.C.C. Claiborne, the new congressionally
appointed chief executive of Louisiana, vetoed the legislative act,
declaring that the power to determine whether the civil law
continued to be in effect in Louisiana was solely the prerogative of
the United States Congress.70 In response to this affront, the
Louisiana Legislature resigned en masse in protest, which was then
followed by a manifesto, signed by the president of the Legislative
Council and published in the New Orleans newspaper, decrying the
governor’s veto.71 This manifesto affirmed Louisiana’s strong
commitment to the civil law and expressed an aversion to American
interference in an area that “embodied their cultural heritage and
assured the stability of social and economic relations.”72 The
Legislature then reconvened on June 7, 1806, and commissioned the
esteemed lawyers and legal scholars James Brown and Louis MoreauLislet to draft a formal civil code for the Louisiana territory.73
Acknowledging the strong sentiment of the people of Louisiana in
retaining their cherished civil law tradition, Governor Claiborne
acquiesced.74 Years later, looking back on this early struggle in his
governorship over Louisiana, Claiborne stated:
We ought to recollect . . . the peculiar circumstances in
which Louisiana is placed, nor ought we to be unmindful of
68. Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the
Jurisprudence of Louisiana: 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1982)
(citing G. DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL
TRADITIONS 132 (1975)).
69. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY
FOR THE UNITED STATES 29 (1993).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 30.
72. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). A portion of the manifesto states:
We certainly do not attempt to draw any parallel between the civil law
and the common law; but, in short, the wisdom of the civil law is
recognized by all Europe; and this law is the one which nineteentwentieths of the population of Louisiana know and are accustomed to
from childhood, of which law they would not see themselves deprived
without falling into despair.
Id.
73. See Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law, supra note 63, at 91.
74. See id.
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the respect due the sentiments and wishes of the ancient
Louisianans who compose so great a proportion of the
population. Educated in a belief in the excellences of the
civil law, the Louisianans have hitherto been unwilling to
part with them . . . .75
Then, at the turn of the 20th century, a young Louisiana law
professor declared that, in essence, Louisiana had become simply
another common law jurisdiction.76 This statement set off a
firestorm of scholarly debate and rebuttals that further solidified
Louisiana’s commitment to the civil law.77 From that time up to
present day, Louisiana has continued to show its commitment to
the civilian cause through the establishment of various societies
and organizations formed to specifically explore and celebrate the
civil law tradition.78 Even an entire agency of state government is
dedicated to preserving and studying this distinctive aspect of
Louisiana.79 To Louisianans, as with all mixed jurisdictions, the
civil law heritage holds a special place, both in its past and in its
present, in what makes the jurisdiction so distinctive and unique.
However, although appreciating and preserving the past is
praiseworthy, Louisiana’s leaders—like those of all mixed
jurisdictions—also recognize that in order for the state to have an
economy that can compete on the regional and national level, as
well as attract individuals to settle and make a life within its borders,
new ideas and reforms are necessary. The law as it existed in 19th
century France does not always serve the same utility today as it
75. HERMAN, supra note 69, at 31 (citing letter from Governor W.C.C.
Claiborne to Judge J. White (Oct. 11, 1808)), in IV OFFICIAL LETTER BOOKS OF
W.C.C. CLAIBORNE (Dunbar Rowland ed., 1917).
76. See Gordon Ireland, Louisiana’s Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L.
REV. 585, 596 (1937).
77. See Daggett et al., supra note 63. A further vibrant scholarly debate
arose in the 1970s that consisted chiefly of trying to ascertain exactly which
civil law sources (i.e., French law or Spanish law) had the greatest influence on
Brown and Moreau-Listlet when drafting their digest of civil laws. See Batiza,
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, supra note 63; Batiza, The Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808, supra note 63; Pascal, supra note 63; Sweeney, supra note 63.
78. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Tucker and the Society of Bartolus, 45 LA. L.
REV. 1017 (1985) (describing Louisiana’s private society of lawyers, judges,
and law professors dedicated to providing an ongoing scholarly discourse on the
civil law); William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law
Institute Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments,
56 LA. B.J. 85 (2008) (describing the legislative agency charged with being the
official law reform arm of the state of Louisiana, as well as highlighting its
various accomplishments).
79. See generally William E. Crawford, The Louisiana State Law Institute—
History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077 (1985).
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did long ago.80 Louisiana, although once predominantly rural and
agrarian, has changed and evolved over time.81 United States
industry, shipping, energy, and various commercial enterprises
occupy a prominent place in the state’s economy.82 These
industries and the ways in which they do business require a
sophisticated and complex legal system in order to facilitate an
efficient and successful marketplace. Louisiana’s economy no
longer stretches merely up and down the Mississippi River and
across the various parishes of the state. Rather, Louisiana operates in
a much larger marketplace where goods are bought and sold and
transactions are consummated globally across borders and
boundaries. Similarly, travel between the states has greatly increased
since Louisiana’s early days, resulting in many residents of the state
having migrated from areas far across the country.83
As a result of the ever-changing and expanding national
economy and the inherent desire to meet the expectations of modern
American society, Louisiana law, like that of many mixed
jurisdictions, has been forced to venture off its civil law island and
adapt to the world around it. Concepts and institutions from other
states and other countries have been enacted and incorporated—both
by Louisiana’s Legislature and its courts—in order to meet the
needs of a robust and dynamic world. Louisiana has, at various
times, dipped its toes into the common law sea and slowly but surely
co-opted or directly enacted various common law concepts and
uniform statutory provisions into its own legal system.84
And yet, Louisiana’s civil law has not been jettisoned altogether.
As a state so deeply immersed in culture and history—and having
80. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, Comment, Laying to Rest an Ancien
Régime: Antiquated Institutions in Louisiana Civil Law and Their Incompatibility
with Modern Public Policies, 70 LA. L. REV. 1367 (2010).
81. See id. at 1368.
82. See, e.g., LOREN C. SCOTT, THE ENERGY SECTOR: STILL A GIANT
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY (2011); STEPHEN FOWLER, EUNJI
KIM, MONICA KINCHEN & MITCHELL ARONOV, LOUISIANA MANUFACTURERS
REGISTER (2013).
83. Louisiana–Migration, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/states
/Louisiana-Migration.html, archived at http://perma.cc/66A6-DLB9 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2015); Florence M. Jumonville, “Formerly the Property of a Lawyer”—
Books That Shaped Louisiana Law, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 161 (2009) (citing
SIDNEY LOUIS VILLERE, THE CANARY ISLAND MIGRATION TO LOUISIANA, 17781783 (New Orleans: Genealogical Research Soc’y of New Orleans, 1971)).
84. See Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing Louisiana’s adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Law); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3831–3850 (1960) (comprising
Louisiana’s enactment of the Uniform Law for the Simplification of Fiduciary
Transfers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:151–182 (1997) (comprising Louisiana’s
enactment of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act).
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fought so vigorously in the past to preserve its legal heritage—such
a move would be abhorrent to Louisiana’s sense of pride and
identity. Instead, existing civil law institutions will often remain in
place, despite the enactment of new, foreign provisions.85 This is
true even when the subject matter of the new law and that of the
existing civil law institution occupy the same or similar spaces.86
Remedies will sometimes be created that are familiar to national and
mainstream interests, even when functionally equivalent rights
already exist under the state’s civil law scheme.87 Even worse,
prevailing doctrines under the common law will be grafted into
Louisiana jurisprudence, even when they conflict or cause friction
and confusion with existing civilian concepts.88
Because of this anchor effect—the reaching into the common
law waters in order to better compete on the national stage, while
still keeping camp on the civil law island in order to preserve a
sense of tradition and identity—many areas of Louisiana law have
actually become less competitive, less mainstream, and less in line
with modern expectations.89 Lawyers and courts dealing with these
conflicting and overlapping institutions are often left confused as
to which concept is more applicable or should govern, and the
result can be a conflation of different doctrines and policies.90 The
end result is anything but a more competitive, clear, and uniform
legal system and does a great injustice to the very civil law
tradition it seeks to honor.91 Through an understanding of these
various Louisiana concepts and legal institutions discussed in the
following sections and their interplay, one gains a better
recognition and understanding of the anchor effect and its negative
consequences in all mixed jurisdictions.
II. ANCHORING THE LAW OF WARRANTIES OF CONDITION
Regardless of the jurisdiction, a primary goal in contracting for
the sale of property is for the buyer to know exactly what he is
purchasing and for the seller to be clear as to exactly what he is
selling.92 The buyer has certain expectations and makes certain
assumptions about the property that motivates and furthers his
desire to consummate the deal. Likewise, the seller has certain
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
See infra Parts II–III.
See infra Parts II–III.
See supra Parts I–III.
See infra Parts II–III.
See infra Parts II–III.
See infra Parts II–III.
UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 100 (2000).
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impressions and understandings about what the buyer believes he
is receiving and what exactly the seller believes he is offering.
Clarity on these points is, in great part, what lends consistency to
the marketplace and makes a stable economy possible.93
In Louisiana, like many mixed jurisdictions, these important
goals are achieved, in part, through implied warranties of
condition.94 In essence, these warranties consist of certain promises
that the seller makes to the purchaser regarding the condition of the
property.95 These include warranting that the property is free of
certain defects and faults, as well as the promise that the property
is fit for use.96 In the event the property fails to meet these
conditions, the law allows the purchaser to, among other things,
rescind the sale if certain conditions are met.97 Under Louisiana’s
civil law—unlike in the common law tradition—warranties of
condition arise automatically in each and every sale of property,
regardless of whether the parties expressly agree to them.98 They
are implied and can only be disposed of through an express and
knowing waiver.99
Throughout Louisiana’s history, the principal warranty of
condition in the sale of property has been the warranty against
redhibitory defects.100 This institution is derived from the Roman
and French civil law tradition, and its precepts continue in
Louisiana’s law of sales today.101 However, in 1993, as part of an
ongoing effort to incorporate more national concepts from the
Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 2 provisions on the law of
sales of goods (movables), the Louisiana Legislature waded into the
waters of its neighboring states and adopted another warranty of
condition—the warranty of fitness.102 This institution is different
93. Id. See generally 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:81 (4th ed.)
(describing the use of legal terms-of-art in commercial transactions under the
Uniform Commercial Code and at common law, and the effects they have on the
relationship and rights of the parties).
94. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2015) (warranty against redhibitory
defects).
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531 (2015) (providing for the liability
of sellers beyond rescission).
98. See, e.g., Smith v. Sonnier, 110 So. 3d 1285 (La. Ct. App. 2013); see
also Neighborhood Shipping, Inc. v. A & B Indus., No. 2010 CA 1651, 2011
WL 1941420 (La. Ct. App. May 6, 2011).
99. See, e.g., Lirette v. Ledet, No. 2011 CA 1060, 2012 WL 1345354 (La.
Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2012); Sabbath v. Martin, No. 44,862-CA, 2009 WL 3449096,
at *2–3 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009).
100. See Spurgeon, supra note 11.
101. See id.
102. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. a (2015).
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from redhibition, but it arises under many similar fact patterns,
thereby creating frequent overlap, confusion, and conflict between
the two devices.103 Unfortunately, the interplay between redhibition
and fitness has contributed in great part to the confusion of both instate and out-of-state lawyers and parties when engaging in
transactions in Louisiana.
A. The Civil Law Doctrine: Warranty Against Redhibitory Defects
The ancient civilian warranty against redhibitory defects grants
a purchaser the right to seek the rescission of a sale when the
property sold contains a hidden defect.104 The rights, requirements,
and procedures for redhibition arise under Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2520 through 2548.105 The primary purposes behind the
warranty is to protect unknowing purchasers against dishonest
sellers, to restore the parties to their positions prior to the sale, and,
when possible, to uphold the stability and sanctity of the
transaction.106
A vice or defect in property will give rise to an action in
redhibition if it meets certain narrowly drawn requirements.107
These include the requirement that the defect render the thing
either completely useless or so inconvenient that the purchaser
would never have bought the thing had he known of the defect.108
A redhibition claim can also arise when, although the thing is not
entirely useless or inconvenient, the defect causes the value of the
thing to be less than what was originally paid.109 Depending on the
category of the defect, the court can either undo the sale
completely or it can order a reduction of the purchase price.110
103. See George L. Bibe, Redhibition and Implied Warranties Under the
1993 Revision of the Louisiana Law of Sales, 54 LA. L. REV. 125, 141 (1993).
104. See TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:64; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT supra note 11, §
11:1.
105. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015). The articles on redhibition
in the Civil Code apply to both immovables and movables. See Guenin v. R.M.
Homes, Inc., 424 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
106. See Bruce V. Schewe & Debra J. Hale, Obligations, 53 LA. L. REV. 917,
919 (1993); Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231–32.
107. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2015).
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.; see also Di Pietro v. Le Blanc, 68 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App.
1953); Russell v. Bartlett, 139 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Glynn v.
Delcuze, 149 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Busenlener v. Peck, 316 So. 2d 27
(La. Ct. App. 1975); Verlander v. Hoffer, 351 So. 2d 229 (La. Ct. App. 1977);
Garrett v. Gayle, 405 So. 2d 622 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Estopinal v. Bourshie, 420
So. 2d 749 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
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It should be noted that an essential element of redhibition is
that the defect must exist at the time the property is purchased, and
such a defect must not be readily discoverable by the purchaser.111
In other words, the defect must be hidden and latent with respect to
the purchaser at the time of the purchase, only rising to the surface
at a later date.112 Redhibition’s rules even allow for an opportunity
to repair and cure a defect when the seller acted in good faith.113
These rules exhibit a strong preference in the law of redhibition to,
when possible, maintain the integrity of the transaction rather than
order it undone.
1. History of the Doctrine
In addition to these laudable qualities, redhibition holds a
singular place on the civil law island due to its ancient roots.114
And arguably, it is this ancient status that has made the institution
so untouchable and, consequently, infrequently amended.
Under Roman law, the first implied warranty of condition arose
at the initiative of those public officials who were charged with
regulating the marketplace.115 Sellers were required to promise
their buyers that the thing being sold was free of defects.116 If a
defect did arise, regardless of whether the seller had knowledge of
it, the buyer had an action to undo the sale.117 Emperor Justinian,
in promulgating his Digest, incorporated the Roman law
warranty—understood at the time as a type of “aedilician” concept,
or rule created by marketplace regulators—as an extension of the
general duty of parties to act in good faith in their dealings with
one another, but the emperor also made some curtailments.118 For
instance, the action was not available if the buyer knew of the
defect.119 Thus, the defect had to be hidden and not readily
discoverable at the time of the sale.120 Further, the remedy of
quanti minoris (i.e., a reduction of the purchase price) was
added.121 Justinian’s revised version of redhibition sought to better
111. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2521, 2530 (2015).
112. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2530 (2015).
113. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531 (2015); see also Pratt v. Himel Marine,
Inc., 823 So. 2d 394 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
114. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1230.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1229.
117. Id. at 1230–31.
118. Id. at 1231.
119. David E. Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical
Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REV. 586, 594 (1961).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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balance the equities between the parties by allowing the action
only when the purchaser did not know of the vice in the property.
This was meant to avoid situations where cunning purchasers
would bring claims frivolously for defects for which they were
always aware.122
When the French Civil Code was developed in the early 1800s,
much of its concepts were rooted in the ancient Roman law, as well
as in Justinian’s Digest.123 As such, the law of redhibition was
incorporated into the French code.124 The stated purpose of the
French law of redhibition was “to protect buyers and the general
public against dangers inherent in all products.”125 Like the Romans,
the French sought to impose a general, blanket warranty that would
automatically arise in all sales in order to further the goal of providing
stability, fairness, and predictability in the marketplace.126 Following
Justinian’s lead, these French rules were clear, concise, and narrowly
tailored so as to apprise all parties as to the safeguards and pitfalls of
contracting for the sale of property.127
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine
The law of redhibition came to Louisiana through its early
incorporation into the Louisiana Civil Code.128 In a state whose
early history was intertwined with the civil law traditions of France
and Spain, the incorporation of redhibition was natural to
Louisiana’s early civil code drafters who found more comfort in
the traditions of the civil law, rather than the more foreign
institutions of the Anglo-American system prevalent throughout
the rest of the United States.129 As in its prior iterations, the
Louisiana version of redhibition required that the vice or defect in
the property be non-apparent, and that both rescission of the sale
and reduction of the purchase price be the possible remedies.130
As might be expected, commercial and consumer transactions
have, over time, taken on greater complexity. And following the
122. See generally id.
123. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231; PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY 114–15 (1999).
124. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231.
125. Id. at 1231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Philippe
Malinvaud, Redhibitory Defects and Their Importance in Contemporary Society,
50 TUL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1976)).
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1232. Herman, supra note 63, at 266.
129. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1232.
130. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015).

760

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

natural progression of all mixed jurisdictions, Louisiana has
variously added its own nuances to redhibition in an effort to
modernize and provide more even-handedness and predictability to
this institution.131 For instance, certain sellers, such as manufacturers,
are deemed to have knowledge of a defect, regardless of whether they
actually do, because of their unique position as the creator of the thing
being sold.132 Although many scholars note that this rule had been
adopted by courts for many years prior to its legislative enactment,
one could nevertheless easily surmise that its direct codification had
something to do with the proliferation of large-scale manufacturing in
the United States and the resulting products liability litigation.133 In
order to keep pace with these national trends, Louisiana adopted a
rule which essentially imputed knowledge of a product’s defects to
the manufacturer for purposes of redhibition, since the one who
created the thing was logically in the best position to know of any
defects in it.134
Despite these changes, however, modifications to redhibition
have been modest.135 Such a dedication to longstanding legal
institutions is a mark of the commitment to history and tradition
embodied in all mixed jurisdictions.136 In fact, aside from a handful
of updating amendments, most of the articles on redhibition in
Louisiana are similar to those contained in the Louisiana Civil
Code going back to 1870.137
B. The Common Law Doctrine: Warranty of Fitness
In addition to the traditional civilian warranty against redhibitory
defects, a buyer may also sue his seller for a breach of the common
law-based—and relatively new to Louisiana—warranty of fitness.138
Under this warranty the seller has a general responsibility to ensure
that the thing he sells is fit for its intended use.139 Generally, the
“intended” use means its ordinary and customary use.140 However, if
the seller has reason to know of the particular use of the thing by
131. See id.
132. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 cmt. b (2015).
133. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 11:16.
134. For a discussion of the history of products liability in Louisiana, see
WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 16:1, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (2d ed. 2012).
135. See Bibe, supra note 103.
136. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1230–37.
137. See id. at 1234.
138. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
139. Id.
140. See TITLE, supra note 11, at § 10:63.
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the buyer and such knowledge is accompanied by a reliance on the
seller’s skill and expertise, then the seller is charged with the
enhanced responsibility of ensuring that the thing the buyer receives
meets those particular needs and uses.141 It is notable that, unlike the
more narrowly drawn institute of redhibition, this warranty is very
broad and expansive.142 It lacks the many limitations of redhibition,
and the breach of the warranty of fitness falls under the more general
rules for the breach of an obligation by a party as articulated in the
Civil Code’s articles of conventional obligations (contracts).143
1. History of the Doctrine
The inherent pull toward incorporating this common law
concept was felt in Louisiana long before its eventual enactment
into the Louisiana Civil Code. Although the warranty of fitness
was not formally adopted until 1993, Louisiana courts had
arguably made general allusions to the existence of the warranty of
fitness in some form or fashion since the early 1900s.144 In the first
case touching on the warranty of fitness, the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated “we are only announcing a principle which no one
denies when we state that the vendor, unless warranty is waived,
warrants the thing sold as fit for the particular purpose for which it
was bought.”145 Further, other cases appeared to suggest that the
existence of the common law warranty of fitness was intertwined
with redhibition’s precepts.146 Some courts suggested that the
warranty was part and parcel of redhibition, while others tended to
indirectly acknowledge that it was a separate warranty derived
from the spirit of redhibition.147 For instance, the court in the 1972
case of Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc. tacitly acknowledged the existence of a
general warranty of fitness, even though the actual UCC statute
141. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
142. See id.
143. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 138 (describing the open-ended remedies
provided by the obligations articles of the Civil Code that are available to a
plaintiff under a warranty of fitness claim).
144. See generally Fee v. Sentell, 28 So. 279 (La. 1900) (“We will not fall
into the error of supposing that a secondhand machine can do the work of a new
one, but it must be fit to do the work the contract shows was intended.”).
145. Id. at 282.
146. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. a (2015).
147. See, e.g., Falk v. Like Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683 (La. 1959); Radalec
Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson v. Bread
Motor Co., Inc., 120 So. 478 (La. 1929); Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct.
App. 1969); Cosey v. Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Bartolotta v.
Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
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would not be legislatively enacted until 21 years later.148 In
essence, the court was talking about the articles on redhibition, but
utilizing different terminology and characteristics.149 This offhanded use of language, some redhibition and some fitness, added
even more confusion as to the existence and applicability of the
warranty of fitness.150
A few years later in 1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court would
again suggest in two different cases that the warranty of fitness
existed either apart from or in tandem with redhibition.151 In the
first case, Rey v. Cuccia, the court went through the traditional
redhibition analysis, but then stated “[h]owever, if [the buyer]
proves that the product purchased is not reasonably fit for its
intended use, it is sufficient that he prove that the object is thus
defective, without his being required to prove the exact or
underlying cause for its malfunction.”152 Later that same year, the
court stated in Hob’s Refrigeration and Air Conditioning, Inc. v.
Poche that “[i]n Louisiana sales, the seller is bound by an implied
warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects and is
reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”153 In neither case
did the court make an ultimate and clear holding regarding the
warranty’s independent existence, preferring instead to make
general statements regarding intended use alongside traditional
declarations about redhibition.154 This mingling of the concepts
suggests that the court was trying to use equitable theories—such
as those which originally gave birth to the common law warranty
of fitness—to expand the scope of redhibition, although it is
arguable from the facts of each whether such an expansion would
have even been necessary in order for the court to achieve the same
results.155
In Media Production, Rey, and Hob’s, the court was seemingly
reaching outside the normal and narrow parameters of redhibition
to incorporate broader principles of recovery—much akin to those
available to courts at common law.156 Initially, the common law
148. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 1972).
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration &
Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974).
152. Rey, 298 So. 2d at 843.
153. Poche, 304 So. 2d at 327 (emphasis added).
154. Rey, 298 So. 2d 840; Poche, 304 So. 2d 326.
155. Rey, 298 So. 2d 840; Poche, 304 So. 2d 326.
156. Rey, 298 So. 2d 840; Poche, 304 So. 2d 326; Media Prod. Consultants,
Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 1972).
Although courts in other states have the ability to exercise equitable powers in
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did not recognize an implied warranty in the sale of property.157
However, in order to promote fairness and equity, courts gradually
began to recognize certain warranties that were inherent in the sale
of property.158 Specifically, in early common law, the rule of
caveat emptor (buyer beware) reigned supreme but was gradually
curtailed in the early 1800s by an action rooted in a hybrid of tort
and contract.159 Unlike jurists in the civil law tradition, courts of
equity at common law were at liberty to fashion remedies that
departed from those explicitly set forth in legislation.160 Similarly,
Louisiana courts dealing with the early concept of the warranty of
fitness can also be characterized as trying to emulate their common
law cousins by providing a broader array of remedies in the
context of sales.161

order to fashion remedies when justice so dictates (a hallmark of the English
common law), Louisiana courts—similar to their civilian cousins—are not
courts of equity and are generally prohibited from engaging in such judicial rulemaking outside the confines of legislation. See Bonneau v. Blalock, 484 So. 2d
275, 276 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“The concept of equity as provided by Article 21
of the Louisiana Civil Code is not interchangeable with the concept of equity in
common law jurisdictions. While we have no doubt imported some legal
principles from the equity of common law jurisdictions as substantive law, we
do not follow the peculiar procedural or adjectival concepts which go with that
system known as equity in those states.”); Osborn v. City of Shreveport, 79 So.
542, 544–45 (La. 1918).
157. See Spurgeon, supra note 11.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 1232.
160. See generally Austin Abbot, The Co-Operation of “Law” and
“Equity;” and the Engrafting of Equitable Remedies Upon Common-Law
Proceedings, 7 HARV. L. REV. 76 (1893); see also Percy H. Winfield, A Concise
History of the Common Law, 43 HARV. L. REV. 339 (1929); Vernon V. Palmer,
The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of
Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 13–14 (1994) (describing that a certain
1812 constitutional, “Creole-inspired provision [was] attempting to restrict
judges to codified legal sources and thus to prevent the surreptitious introduction
of the unwritten common law or Spanish law into the jurisprudence of the state.
Under this particular-loi provision, the framers struck hard at unwritten equity
and seemed to deny the judges a general praetorian power to correct or
supplement the law with doctrines of their choosing.”).
161. See, e.g., Falk v. Like Motor Co., Inc., 112 So. 2d 683 (La. 1959);
Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson v.
Bread Motor Co., 120 So. 478 (La. 1929); Crawford v. Abott Auto. Co., 101 So.
871 (La. 1924); Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Cosey v.
Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d
208 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
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2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine
In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature expressly recognized the often
confused and misidentified warranty of fitness by incorporating its
codified version from the Uniform Commercial Code directly into
the Louisiana Civil Code.162 To further add to its shiftless history,
the new article was placed in the chapter on redhibition, and the
accompanying comments disclaimed any connection to the early
common law concept of the warranty of fitness—a concept that
Louisiana courts had nonetheless been vaguely referring to since
the early 1900s.163 The new article was simple and succinct. Rather
than containing the intricate rules, requirements, and exclusive
remedies available under redhibition, the new Louisiana Civil
Code article 2524 was short and open-ended. If the warranty of
fitness is breached, the remedies are those available under the
general law of obligations (contracts), without limitation.164
Unlike redhibition, with its narrow possibilities in the way of
damages, reduction of the purchase price, or rescission of the sale,
the new warranty of fitness left open the possibility of a varied
bundle of remedies.165 In the comments to the article, the drafters
explicitly noted that “[t]he Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized
the existence of [the warranty of fitness] although, in most
instances, it has been confused with the warranty against
redhibitory vices.”166
Although the Louisiana State Law Institute declared that the
introduction of Louisiana Civil Code article 2524 did not change
the law, the subsequent jurisprudence would suggest otherwise.167
Whereas before 1993 the warranty only existed in jurisprudence—
as shown in Media Consultants, Hob’s, and Rey—as either a
jurisprudential gloss on redhibition or as a casual independent
statement of the court on the responsibilities of a seller,168 the
162. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 142. Under UCC Article 2, the warranty of
fitness, as it is known in Louisiana, is actually comprised of two warranties: the
warranty of merchantability (covering general fitness) and the warranty of
fitness (covering particular-use fitness). See id. In Louisiana, both are simply
known as the warranty of fitness and the substance in collapsed into one code
article. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
163. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmts. a–d (2015).
164. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. b (2015).
165. See id.
166. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. a (2015).
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration
and Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974); Falk v. Like
Motor Co. Inc., 112 So. 2d 683 (La. 1959); Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing
Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson v. Bread Motor Co., 120 So. 478 (La.

2015]

LEGAL REFORM IN A MIXED JURISDICTION

765

enactment of the new article specifically codified the new
warranty.169 Taken in context, the introduction of the warranty of
fitness was part of a much larger “comprehensive revision of Civil
Code Articles on Sales.”170 The goal of this revision—so common
among legal reformers in mixed jurisdictions—was to update and
modernize the law of sales in Louisiana, which included the
adoption of some, but not nearly all, aspects of the nationally
prevalent Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.171
In general, the purpose of the UCC was to engender
standardization by creating a model, streamlined set of laws to govern
commercial transactions.172 Almost every state in the United States
has adopted Article 2, which deals with the sale of goods, except for
Louisiana.173 This was due in large part to the belief that the common
law concepts in Article 2 were incompatible with Louisiana’s larger
civil law scheme.174 Nonetheless, many provisions of Louisiana’s law
of sales were changed and select concepts from Article 2 were
introduced, including the warranty of fitness found in sections 2-314
and 2-315 of Article 2.175 Such, it can be argued, was the result of
Louisiana’s desire to enhance its commercial competitiveness by
enacting laws which are common to other states, while nonetheless
maintaining its unique legal institutions.176 However, in this
instance, and judging from the facts of the cases described above,
there is little reason to believe that the same results could not have

1929); Crawford v. Abott Automobile Co., 101 So. 871 (La. 1924); Craig v.
Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Cosey v. Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97
(La. Ct. App. 1967); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208 (La. Ct. App. 1955).
169. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 125.
170. See id. (citing to House Bill 106 as the source of the enactment).
171. See id. at 147.
172. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 810 (1958); see generally DOUGLAS LITOWITZ,
PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2001).
173. See ESPOSÉ DES MOTIFS TO THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES (1995);
UCC § 2 (2010).
174. See La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
175. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 142.
176. Many scholars have noted that almost all efforts to promote uniform
laws have involved the cherry-picking of concepts from various legal traditions
to arrive at the final product. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON
HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE
JURISPRUDENCE (1967); Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive
Le Roi, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 625 (1993); Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment
of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435 (2000);
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J.
156 (1987).
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flowed from merely utilizing redihibition, without making references
to fitness.177 In this way, Louisiana law was not deficient such that the
UCC’s version of the warranty of fitness was necessary in order to
meet Louisiana’s commercial goals. Rather, it appears to have been
gratuitously enacted as part of a larger, and perhaps somewhat
blinded, desire to make the law of sales in this particular area look
more like the laws of the UCC in other states. It is easy to see how
similar motivations to align the law of a particular locale with
prevailing common law concepts could be similarly present in the
law reform process of other mixed jurisdictions.
C. Conflict Between the Two: Overlap and Confusion
What Louisiana has been left with are two warranties,
extremely similar in purpose and applicability, but inherently
different in structure and complexity. The incorporation of the
warranty of fitness was part of an effort to update and enhance an
area of the law that was otherwise viewed as outmoded and not in
tune with the prevailing customs and practices of the commercial
world.178 At the time, Louisiana’s law of sales represented a
traditional stronghold of the civil law. But as an island in a sea of
common law states, Louisiana determined that adopting more
mainstream institutions would further the state’s economic
goals.179
Not eager to be completely submerged under the common law
waters, Louisiana chose to moor itself to the ancient civil law
institution of redhibition.180 Since redhibition had long been a part
of Louisiana law, stretching back into French and Roman times, it
had a strong and direct connection to Louisiana’s roots, and thus
served as a natural object of the state’s affinity for maintaining its
traditional and historical legal institutions.181
In light of the common law’s gradual retreat from caveat
emptor, one might say that redhibition was ahead of its time in that
it provided an implied warranty before the common law’s hybrid
tort and contract warranty principles began to arise, and certainly
well ahead of the UCC’s warranty of fitness.182 Originally, the law
of sales of personal property at common law adhered to the general
principle that the “buyer should beware” in making his purchases,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion.
See Bibe, supra note 103, at 138–44.
See generally id.
See id. at 126.
See generally id.
See id.
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since any defects or problems with the object of his purchase
would be born solely by him.183 But over time the application of
this strict rule caused harsh results, and courts began to find an
equitable remedy through a combination of tort and contract
theories—thus giving birth to the first form of the warranty of
fitness.184
Redhibition, on the other hand, has been around since early
Roman law in a much more sophisticated and direct fashion than
the judge-made contract-tort warranty at common law.185 Some
scholars, such as Professor James Gordley, have even suggested
that the precepts of many common law contract theories—of which
the warranty of fitness is one—were in fact originally taken from
the much more ancient and established civil law tradition—thereby
suggesting that redhibition actually inspired common law courts to
create the warranty of fitness.186 However, redhibition is structured
so as to balance the rights of the buyer and seller by providing
different rules to cover different transactions. But, whatever its
merits, the way in which redhibition was maintained alongside the
incorporation of the warranty of fitness serves as a major contributor
to the anchor effect in this mixed jurisdiction. Redhibition is meant
to protect the marketplace from corrupt sellers in certain narrowly
defined situations where the law deems the purchaser to be in such a
situation as to be unable to make an informed decision about his
purchase.187 The institution is narrowly defined so as to only
contemplate and provide a remedy for specific situations.188
By the same token, redhibition seeks to balance the rights of the
parties by allowing the seller the opportunity to repair a defect if he, at
the time of the sale, did not know of it.189 Thus, the law of redhibition
does not seek to rescind or modify transactions indiscriminately, but
rather assumes that if the defect or vice were removed, the purchaser
would nonetheless still have purchased the thing.190 The virtue of this
mainstay of the civil law island is seen through its temperate and
balanced approach to private party conflict.

183. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
L.J. 1133 (1931).
184. See id.
185. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 11:1.
186. See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991).
187. Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1229–30.
188. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015).
189. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522 (2015).
190. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015).
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On the other hand, the warranty of fitness is much broader.191
In redhibition, a good faith seller has the ability to repair, and, if he
cannot, he must return the purchase price and any incidental
expenses of the transactions.192 Only if the seller is in bad faith
(i.e., knew of the defect at the time he sold it) do remedies for
damages arise.193 Under the warranty of fitness, however, the
possibilities are much wider.194 First, the concept of good or bad
faith does not matter in such a definitive way.195 If there is a breach
of the warranty, then the rules on conventional obligations
automatically apply.196 Under these rules, damages are always a
possibility, as is the dissolution of the sale.197 Hence, the power
lies in the hands of the petitioning purchaser, rather than with an
equitable and balanced statutory framework.198
It is also noted that redhibition, in the case of bad faith sellers,
also affords the opportunity to recover attorney’s fees, while the
general rules on conventional obligations do not allow for such
automatic recovery.199 The rationale for the difference in the rule
seems unintelligible since the culpability of a bad faith seller in
redhibition and a bad faith seller in the warranty of fitness would
both seem to rise to the same or at least a substantially similar level
of offense. Further, nothing in the Civil Code suggests that the two
actions cannot be brought at the same time for the same sale.200
Thus, it is possible for an aggrieved purchaser to sue under both
redhibition and the warranty of fitness.201 If the court finds that the
thing was not defective at the time of the sale, the purchaser may
still prevail by showing that it was not fit for its ordinary use.202
Still, if it can be proved that the seller knew of the purchaser’s
specific need for the thing then the purchaser may prevail by
showing that the thing was not fit for his particular need.203
Conversely, a good faith seller would benefit more by arguing that
191. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
192. See TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:84.
193. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 (2015).
194. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
195. See id. It should be noted, however, that the Louisiana Law of
Obligations also provides a general duty of good faith in contracts for all parties.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2015); see also Gibbs Const. Co., v. Thomas, 500
So. 2d 764, 768 (La. 1987).
196. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. b (2015).
197. Bibe, supra note 103, at 140.
198. See id.
199. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 (2015).
200. Bibe, supra note 103, at 139.
201. See id. at 138–41.
202. See id.
203. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015).
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an action falls under redhibition so that he could have a chance to
repair the item and ultimately be held liable for a lesser amount.204
Furthermore, a purchased thing can fail to meet the particular
purposes of the purchaser but still be fit for its ordinary use and not
afflicted with a hidden and latent defect. However, a thing with a
latent, hidden defect would generally be unfit for its ordinary
purpose and one would assume that the reverse would also be
true—thus the confusion.
To out-of-state parties conducting business in the mixed
jurisdiction of Louisiana, this peculiar and confusing overlap can
be the cause of much consternation. Parties cannot be sure with
any certainty as to their exact responsibilities vis-à-vis each other.
This is made more difficult when trying to make a determination as
to the potential liability of a party seeking to make an investment
or conduct a series of purchases or sales in Louisiana. Moreover,
non-Louisiana parties may be surprised to learn that the warranty
of fitness also applies to immovable property; the warranty is
relegated to only movable property under the UCC.205 From a
seller’s point of view, he must be careful not to evidence to the
purchaser that he knows of the purchaser’s particular intended use
of the property so as not to possibly trigger the heightened standard
under the warranty of fitness.206
Recent cases reveal the continued difficulty that courts have
with the reconciliation of these related, but essentially different,
warranties. In the 2000 case of Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had a chance
to ruminate on the warranty of fitness and its interaction with
redhibition through a claim for damages caused by cigarette
smoking.207 The matter before the court was a procedural one, but,
in reaching the ultimate holding, the court meditated on what was
necessary to succeed in a cause of action under redhibition and
under the warranty of fitness when they were brought together.208
In doing so, the court stated that the ability to prevail depended
upon:
(1) whether the fact that smoking cigarettes has serious
adverse health effects and is addictive constitutes a
redhibitive defect in the cigarettes or a defect warranted
against under article 2475; (2) whether it is judicially known
that at the relevant time there was such common knowledge
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522 (2015).
See, e.g., Fontenot v. Saxby, 34 So. 3d 477 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 (2015).
See Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 236 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 285.
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of the adverse effects of cigarette smoking as to preclude such
redhibition and article 2475 claims; and (3) whether the lack
of privity between the Louisiana wholesalers and Badon
precludes her redhibition and article 2475 claims against those
wholesalers who were not, and did not with respect to
consumers occupy the position of, manufacturers of the
cigarettes.209
Here again—as seen in some cases prior to the official adoption of
the warranty of fitness in 1993—the court declared that the
warranties are separate and distinct, but then combined the two
when analyzing their constituent parts.210
The first element calls into question whether cigarettes have an
inherent defect or vice.211 This language leans more toward the
redhibition analysis, because it fails to focus at all on the intended
or ordinary use of cigarettes and whether these particular cigarettes
in question could meet that use.212 The second element goes
toward the knowledge of the courts at the time of such vices or
defects.213 Strangely, this concept is out of place in the analysis
under either of the warranties. It asks nothing of the ordinary or
particular use of the thing with respect to the purchaser and, insofar
as redhibition goes, it adds an extra-codal element in introducing
the relevancy of whether it was the common knowledge of the
courts at the time that cigarettes posed a health risk.214
Lastly, the relevancy of manufacturers (who are deemed to be
in bad faith in redhibition) is grafted into the warranty of fitness
analysis, even though Civil Code article 2524 does not provide for
different rules for these types of parties.215 Through the lens of this
court’s analysis, it is difficult to tell with any certainty what is
actually taking place in the jurisprudence.216 On the one hand, it
appears the court was viewing the warranty of fitness as a subpart
or component of redhibition.217 On the other, the court may have
been trying to expand the scope of what constitutes redhibition.218
It appears fairly clear that, at least in Badon, the court is certainly

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id.
Id. at 285–87.
Id. at 285.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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not recognizing the warranty of fitness as an independent cause of
action.219
Similarly, in the 2000 case of Cunard Line Ltd. Co. v. Datrex,
Inc., a warranty claim arose over the proper prescriptive period for an
action related to defective and incorrectly installed cruise ship
lights.220 As in Badon, the court in Cunard recognized that redhibition
and the warranty of fitness are two separate warranties.221 The
petitioner alleged that the lights were “unsuitable for ordinary use in a
cruise ship” and that the plaintiff “did in fact rely upon DATREX’S
skill, judgment and representations regarding the” selection and
installation of the lights.222 Alongside these allegations, the plaintiff
also challenged the defective nature of the lights under redhibition.223
Strangely—and despite having made the proper allegations for a
claim under the warranty of fitness—the court held that because the
plaintiff’s “cause of action is based on the allegedly defective nature
of the LLL systems, it is limited to the prescriptive period for
redhibitory defects and may not avail itself of the ten-year
prescriptive period for conventional obligations.”224 Here again the
courts are struggling to sort through the two warranties and
matching the facts to the requirements in a way that creates a
coherent and reliable enforcement of rights.225 However, in Datrex
the court did a better job of distinguishing between the two
warranties by specifically recognizing that they were separate legal
concepts with separate prescriptive rules, which the court in Badon
struggled with when it appeared to describe fitness as being
subsumed by redhibition.226
In the most recent case on the warranty of fitness, the court in
Fontenot v. Saxby dealt with the sale of immovable property to an
individual who was precluded from building a residence on a
parcel because of a building restriction.227 She sued her seller’s
219. Id.
220. Cunard Line Ltd. Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109, 111 (La. Ct. App.
2006).
221. Id. at 114 (“Thus, it appears that the legislature intended to separate and
categorize three different types of warranties applicable to sales rather than to
have all such warranties defaulted into the category of the warranty against
redhibitory defects. Accordingly, we conclude that [Civil Code article 2524]
applies to a situation in which the cause of action is based, not on the defective
nature of the thing at issue, but on its fitness for ordinary use and/or for a
particular use or purpose.”).
222. Id. at 113.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 114.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Fontenot v. Saxby, 34 So. 3d 477, 479 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
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predecessor-in-title who had originally subdivided the land,
claiming breach of the seller’s warranty against redhibition and the
warranty of fitness.228 The court held that any claims in redhibition
were prescribed, but then, after reciting Louisiana Civil Code article
2425, stated that the plaintiff Fontenot:
[D]oes not allege in her petition or brief that she relied on
any skill or judgment of Saxby in choosing this particular
piece of property and therefore cannot claim that under this
article the thing was not fit for its intended use. Accordingly,
the record does not support that Fontenot is entitled to any
review of her relief under the general rules of contract.229
It is noticeable that the court pools together the general
provisions of the warranty of fitness dealing with a thing’s
ordinary use with the stipulations where its particular use comes
into play.230 Under the court’s holding, one would think that if
there is no reliance on the skill of the seller in order to support the
selection of the property for the purchaser’s particular use, then
there can be no claim for a warranty of fitness at all.231 This is
clearly not the case under the plain words of the first part of Civil
Code article 2524, which states “[t]he thing sold must be
reasonably fit for its ordinary use.”232
As seen through these recent cases, Louisiana’s anchoring to
redhibition has resulted in the watering down of both the warranty
of fitness and redhibition because both of their requirements and
elements are often conflated, and, as a sign of its questionable
viability, claims under the fitness warranty are rarely successful.233
The anchor effect, in the case of redhibition and fitness, has
done equal harm to both institutions. Sometimes courts combine
rehibition and the warranty of fitness; other times they appear to
favor redhibition, having it subsume fitness; and still at other times
they appear to expand redhibition using concepts from the warranty
of fitness.234 In doing so, this mixed jurisdiction’s general law of
warranty has been anchored down, both becoming less like the

228. Id. at 480.
229. Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
230. See id. at 481–82.
231. See id. at 483.
232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015) (emphasis added).
233. Cf. Bio-Pic Foods v. Polyflex Film & Converting, Inc., 665 So. 2d 787
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (providing one of the only examples in Louisiana
jurisprudence where a plaintiff has prevailed on a claim under the warranty of
fitness).
234. See supra Part II.
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uniform laws of other states and contributing to a less competitive
commercial environment.
III. ANCHORING THE LAW OF CONTRACTUAL FAIRNESS
One of the most well recognized principles of the common law
is freedom of contract.235 This precept stands for the notion that
private parties are generally free to enter into whatever agreements
they deem necessary, appropriate, or desirable, just as long as they
are not against public policy.236 At the heart of this concept is the
idea that markets work best and commerce flourishes most when
individuals are able to enter into private dealings without the heavy
hand of government oversight or burdensome legal restrictions to
weigh them down.237 Such freedom encourages innovation in
business dealings, which in turn supports and encourages
economic growth and prosperity.238
However, there are instances where public policy dictates that
the benefits of certain agreements are outweighed by their negative
consequences.239 Such examples include agreements that are
illegal, immoral, or are unjust to disadvantaged or vulnerable
parties.240 In these instances, the law seeks to limit the general
liberties of contract by placing restraints or outright prohibitions on
what may be agreed upon.241 This is particularly the case when the
law seeks to protect a party that has unequal or little to no
bargaining power in negotiations.242
Although mixed-jurisdiction judges in Louisiana have often
declared that “[c]ourts are not created to relieve men of their bad
bargains made,”243 the state’s law of conventional obligations
235. See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1:2 (2014);
16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 720 (2014).
236. See Kennedy v. Durden, 116 So. 3d 12, 16 (La. Ct. App. 2013); see also
id. at 17 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
237. See generally ROBERT A. SIRICO, DEFENDING THE FREE MARKET: THE
MORAL CASE FOR A FREE ECONOMY (2012); Timothy A. Canova, The
Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to
Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1295 (1995).
238. See generally JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS (2012).
239. See First Guar. Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Ctr., Inc., 529 So. 2d
834, 842 (La. 1987) (“Rules of public order are those which an individual is
expressly or impliedly prohibited from renouncing because they have been
enacted for the protection of the public interest.”).
240. See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012).
241. See MARTIN HEVIA, 101 REASONABLENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY: A
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW (Springer 2013).
242. See id. at 243.
243. Lama v. Manale, 50 So. 2d 15, 16 (La. 1950).
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(contracts) nonetheless endeavors, albeit in a narrow fashion, to
strike a careful balance between freedom of contract and protecting
against unjust agreements.244 This is seen best through the longheld civilian institution of lesion beyond moiety, which seeks to
give recourse to a seller of corporeal immovable property (tangible
real property) when the price paid is less than one-half the fair
market value.245 Under this concept, the law places a bright-line
limitation on the ability of private parties to determine the amount
that ought to be paid for property.246
Similarly, in some respects to lesion, since at least the 1920s,
Louisiana has utilized a phantom version of the common law’s
doctrine of unconscionability which seeks to curtail contracts
where one of the parties to the agreement is determined to be
overly vulnerable or lacks sufficient bargaining power.247 Although
never specifically or formally incorporating the concept into
Louisiana law, the state’s courts have nonetheless frequently used
its precepts—under the guise of existing, legislatively created
institutions—to undo or modify contracts that they determine to be
unjust or inequitable.248
As with redhibition and the warranty of fitness, both lesion and
unconscionability seek to place rules on the freedoms of the
marketplace in order to balance the equities and provide safety and
protection to the unwitting buyer.249 Both institutions represent a
sort of conflict between the citadels of the civil law and the
clashing waters of the common law sea. However, one of the
institutions is narrowly tailored and specific, while the other is
broad and vague.250 Although unconscionability gives Louisiana
courts wide latitude to police unjust agreements in whatever form
they may take, lesion is limited in the type of harm and injustice it
seeks to thwart.251
Although such a limited remedy may have made sense in a more
agrarian or less complex commercial economy, the intricate and
244. See, e.g., Saúl Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress, and an
Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Vices of
Consent]; Ronald L. Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the
Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315 (1983); Saúl Litvinoff, Consent
Revisited, 47 LA. L. REV. 699 (1987).
245. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2015); TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:15;
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:2.
246. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:6.
247. See Hersbergen, supra note 244, at 1318.
248. Id. at 1411–12.
249. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
250. See generally Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 17;
Hersbergen, supra note 244, at 1365.
251. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464 (2015).
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sophisticated business and consumer world of today necessitates
broader and more flexible remedies.252 For instance, lesion’s focus
on the disparity of the price versus the value of the thing is only but
one component of the much broader doctrine of unconscionability
that extends to more general issues involving deception and
unfairness. These additional instances of contractual injustice—all
in the absence of legislative action—have been developed in a subtle
way by Louisiana courts in order to meet the expectations of a
changing society.253 However, despite this subconscious desire to
expand such remedies, lesion, a mainstay of Louisiana’s civil law
tradition, has remained unchanged.254 By anchoring itself to this
rigid and limited institution, Louisiana law has been forced to morph
in an intellectually insincere and unclear way in order to
accommodate a changing consumer marketplace.255
A. The Civil Law Doctrine: Lesion Beyond Moiety
The right to invoke lesion beyond moiety arises from the
Louisiana Civil Code’s pronouncement that the price paid for
immovable property “must not be out of all proportion with the
value of the thing sold.”256 Such a concept seeks to protect the
seller who may be unsophisticated in his negotiations or who
suffers at the hands of an exceedingly manipulative and cunning
buyer.257 Further, it also seeks to protect the rights of the seller’s
creditors who wish to safeguard against the seller divesting himself
of his assets for consideration that is less than that which would
otherwise be obtained in the fair and open market.258 As a further
limitation, lesion is only available for corporeal immovable
property (tangible real property), and nothing else.259
The theory behind lesion comes from the idea that, in a true
commutative contract, one gives up something of value in return
for something of roughly equal value.260 The contract is no longer
252. See JOHN D. STERMAN, BUSINESS DYNAMICS: SYSTEMS THINKING AND
MODELING FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (2000).
253. See generally BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (6th
ed. 2012); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION (1993).
254. Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 113–15.
255. See generally id.
256. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464 (2015).
257. See generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:2 (describing the
conceptual underpinnings of lesion).
258. See TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:15.
259. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2015).
260. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:3 (describing the history of
lesion).
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thought of as equal when the amount received is less than one-half
the value of the thing that is given up.261 In those cases involving
the contract of sale, the law creates an unrebuttable presumption
that the seller must have been in error in having given up the thing,
because he would surely not have agreed to do so if he knew what
comparatively little he was receiving in return.262 The law takes
such a strong stance as to this presumption that—unlike with the
warranties of condition—a party may not waive or otherwise do
away with the action for lesion even if he does so expressly in
writing.263 Even a seller who has renounced lesion and made such
waiver a principal term of the sale can nevertheless still bring an
action for lesion if the requirements are met.264 If a seller is
successful under lesion he may seek to have the thing returned to
him, and he must return the purchase price, or, in the alternative,
the buyer will give the seller a supplement in an amount sufficient
to bring the price up to the fair market value of the thing sold.265
But the most striking and important aspect of lesion is its very
limited scope. For instance, the only avenue that may be used to
avoid an action for lesion would be to prove that the transaction
was actually an onerous donation.266 In order to qualify for this
classification, however, the transaction would have to meet the
form and intent requirements for a valid donation.267 Further, the
action must be brought within a one-year peremptive period from
the date of the sale.268 Special additional rules apply to prevent the
rescission of the sale for lesion when the buyer has subsequently
sold the property to a third party, but even then some form of
recourse is accorded to the seller.269 Various protections are also
given to secured parties who obtain a security interest in the
property prior to the action for lesion being exercised.270 Each rule

261. See id.
262. TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:16; see also TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note
11, §§ 13:1–13:5.
263. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2015).
264. See Dupree v. Myers, 138 So. 146, 147 (La. Ct. App. 1931).
265. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2591 (2015).
266. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, §§ 13:1–13:25.
267. Id. See also TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:17; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 522
So. 2d 1356, 1358 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2595 (2015).
269. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:15. See also TITLE, supra note
11, § 10:22.
270. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 13:18. See also TITLE, supra note
11, § 10:23.
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is specific and detailed and avoids extending any discretion to
courts that might attempt to expand lesion’s limited scope.271
1. History of the Doctrine
Much like redhibition, lesion is long-standing on the civil law
island.272 Although preceded by a more limited Roman law institution
for protecting minors called restitutio in integrum, lesion beyond
moiety first appeared in substantial form during the time of the early
Christian Roman emperors.273 This early form of lesion, called
lasesio enormis, was meant to protect petty landowners who were
often under harsh economic pressure during the later years of the
empire to sell their lands to their wealthier, aristocratic neighbors.274
By preventing a sale that would yield to the improvident landowner
less than half the value of his land, Roman law sought to afford
protections and a balancing of the equities in these transactions.275
Later, as Christianity became more entrenched in early Europe,
the idea behind lesion would permeate into the central tenets of
Canon Law—which, among other things, demanded that a fair and
reasonable return be given in every contract—and eventually began
to pervade all forms of contract law.276 This great wave of Christian
legal thinking made its way into other forms of transactions aside
from merely those involving property.277 Contracts for services and
interest on loans, as well as any other form of agreements whereby
an excessive advantage was given to any one party were also
included under lesion.278
Turning to early French law, because of the economic and
political woes that were a hallmark of 17th and 18th century pre271. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, §§ 13:1–13:25. See also TITLE,
supra note 11, § 10:23; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2589–2600 (2015).
272. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244.
273. See SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 4, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 13–17 (1969).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 357–58.
276. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 109. In early
European times when Cannon Law was heavily influential, lesion was available
for the sale of movable property as well. See id. at 43 n.231. The idea of that
fundamental fairness is required in all private dealings is often known as the
theory of commutative justice, which was notably articulated by St. Thomas
Aquinas in his famed Summa Theologiae. See Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs,
and Responsibility: Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice, 103
YALE L.J. 861, 861–62 (1993) (citing 37 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE 87–101 (Thomas Gilby trans., Blackfriars 1975)).
277. See LITVINOFF, supra note 273, §4.
278. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 109.
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revolutionary France, litigation dealing with lesion was rampant in
the French courts.279 This sparked a general fear that the institution
was causing serious damage to and uncertainty in the stability of
private transactions.280 Thus, during the tumultuous legal reforms
brought about by the various post-revolutionary governments, lesion
beyond moiety was eliminated in its entirety.281
Finally, the Emperor Napoleon reintroduced the institution of
lesion when he promulgated the French Code Civil.282 However, its
breadth and substance were much diminished from its earlier
canonical form.283 For instance, the action was made available only
in cases of sales and partitions and restricted to only immovable
property.284 At the time, this restricted application was supported
by the notion that movable property had little value compared to
that of land and that land, as a general rule, was subject to less
variability in value.285 It was at this time that the institution was
also limited to only the seller under the theory that only the person
giving up the immovable could reasonably be susceptible to
necessitous circumstances.286
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine
It was in this form, as articulated in the French Code Civil, that
the institution of lesion beyond moiety was incorporated into
Louisiana law and the law of most other mixed jurisdictions.287 Few
changes—such as the time period for bringing an action and the
circumstances governing when rescission, as opposed to
supplementing the price, may be demanded—have been made to
Louisiana’s law of lesion, and it remains largely the same as when it
was originally enacted into the French Code Civil.288 Nonetheless,
this preservation is consistent with Louisiana’s strong desire to
uphold its traditional institutions, even to the point of allowing them
to remain relatively unchanged for multiple centuries.
279. See LITVINOFF, supra note 273.
280. Id. See also SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (2004); ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN RÉGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (2011).
281. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 109.
282. See LITVINOFF, supra note 273, § 4.
283. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 109–10; CODE CIVIL
[C. CIV.] arts. 877,1674 (Fr.).
284. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 244, at 109–10.
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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With lesion, Louisiana courts have declined to augment the
circumstances under which it may arise, even when the facts of a
case might otherwise merit an equitable expansion of the concept.
For instance, courts have rejected using lesion for the sale of
incorporeals, regardless of the inadequacy of the price or the
vulnerable position of the buyer, such as with the sale of rights of
inheritance, obligations, and intellectual property.289 And, despite
the development of markets for property other than real estate—as
well as changing economic circumstances that might impact what
is deemed a “fair” price—lesion has not been otherwise modified
or expanded to take these changing expectations of a modern world
into account.290
One area that has been the source of particular trouble for
Louisiana courts involves cases for lesion where the right at issue
involves immovable property, but not purely corporeal immovable
property. For instance, the sale of servitudes has been held to be
outside the protections of lesion.291 On the other hand, in cases
involving the transfer of mineral rights, courts have upheld the
existence of the minerals as a valid component in computing the
fair market value of the land being conveyed for purposes of
determining whether the purchase price is lesionary.292
Mineral rights are a form of incorporeal immovable under
Louisiana law.293 Because of this, they are generally not subject to
lesion, even when they are transferred for less than half their fair
market value.294 This general rule is further stated in article 7 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code, which declares that lesion is inapplicable
to all “mineral transactions.”295 But the court in Hornsby v. Slade
added a bit more nuance to this general proposition.296 In Hornsby,
289. See Webb v. State Through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 470 So. 2d 994,
996 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
290. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2589–2600 (2015). Other mixed jurisdictions have
taken into account changes societal norms and revised the institution of lesion. See
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1406 (Can.); CODE DES OBLIGATIONS
[CO] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, art. 21 (Switz.); BÜRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 42, as
amended, § 138 (Ger.); CODICE CIVILE [C.C.] art. 1448 (It.); Kerianne Wilson, Alive
and Kicking—The Story of Lesion and the Civil Code of Québec, 51 LES CAHIERS
DE DROIT 445 (2010).
291. See Dunckelman v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., 291 So. 2d 914, 919 (La. Ct.
App. 1974).
292. See Hornsby v. Slade, 854 So. 2d 441, 445–46 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
293. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2015).
294. See Opelousas Prod. Credit Ass’n v. B.B. & H., Inc., 525 So. 2d 91 (La.
Ct. App. 1988).
295. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17 (2007).
296. See Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 445.
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immovable property was sold for a certain price, but once it was in
the hands of the purchaser, it was discovered that valuable minerals
existed under the property.297 The seller brought an action to rescind
the sale on the grounds of lesion, stating that the value of the
minerals should go into the overall value calculation of the
property.298 The court stated that while mineral rights are generally a
form of incorporeal movables, until they are reduced to possession
they are an integral part of the land.299 As such, their presence in
conjunction with the immovable property is not an inconsequential
factor in determining the fair market value of the land.300 The court
specifically held that because mineral rights are component parts of
the land itself that their value should be used for purposes of the
“lesionary inquiry” when they are sold with the land.301
In sum, lesion is largely unchanged since its earliest days in
Louisiana. The rationale of the Romans and the French that
initially dictated the rules and limitations of lesion have continued
to govern its applicability, even when such rationale is arguably no
longer valid.
B. The Common Law Doctrine: Unconscionability
But lesion is not alone in Louisiana’s arsenal of remedies to
police unjust contracts. A separate but similar common law device
has been transplanted in Louisiana law to assist in this endeavor as
well. The doctrine of unconscionability can be traced back to early
English law, which sought to provide prohibitions for certain
contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept
on the other.”302 Since then, a multitude of American states have
utilized this principle, and even the United States Supreme Court
has referenced some form of the doctrine on occasion.303
297. Id. at 442.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 445.
300. Id. at 445–46.
301. Id. at 446.
302. See E. of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750).
303. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (2009); Mississippi & M.R. Co. v.
Cromwell, 91 U.S. 643 (1875); Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind.
1971); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa
1975); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967);
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter., Inc., 58
A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d 405
(Wash. 1971); Educ. Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct.
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Courts have often declared that the power to police private
contracts in this manner is part of the judiciary’s inherent and
intrinsic powers, with no further authorization being necessary.304
Consequently, the power is not derived from legislation, but rather
from general jurisprudential and constitutional principles that allow
the judiciary to refuse to enforce unfair contracts or provisions that
are deemed too burdensome, onerous, or one-sided.305
1. History of the Doctrine
Although the doctrine was seldom used in its earliest period, as
goods came into mass production and as the marketplace grew and
became more complex, courts became more sensitive to commercial
injustices and came to use the doctrine more frequently.306 This
motivation was derived from the fear that certain individuals,
because of their skill, profession, economic strength, stature, or
association, were in a position to monopolize and exert undue
control over consumers.307 Such abuse would impair and forever
mar the common and ordinary understanding of fairness in armslength transactions.308 As a result, courts began to view themselves
as the natural protectors and mediators of the marketplace and began
employing the doctrine in more frequent and robust ways.309 Certain
contracts or clauses were deemed so offensive to societal notions of
fairness and equity that they were held unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable. 310
In order to validate the use of this equitable theory, courts
couched their use of the doctrine as merely a manifestation of their
ability to invalidate any agreement on the basis of a defect in
consent.311 Since the agreement was so out of sorts with the natural
interests of a particular party and so onerous and overreaching, no
reasonable person would have knowingly agreed to it.312 Thus, the
1971), Lazan v. Huntington Town House, Inc., 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Dist. Ct.
1969), Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
304. See generally Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COMM. L. J. 287 (2000).
305. Id.
306. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clothes, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
307. See id.; UCC § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1978).
308. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012).
309. See Hersbergen, supra note 244, at 1316–17.
310. Id. at 1317.
311. Id. at 1317–18.
312. Id.
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party lacked the requisite legal consent, and the contract could be
annulled.313
It should be noted that this type of judicial remedy making is a
hallmark of the common law system—an occurrence that would, at
least in theory, be loathed in the civil law. Common law chancery
courts, going back to early English law, have always had the
ability to confect equitable remedies that, although not specifically
provided for by legislation, were justified because of fairness
considerations.314 Civil law courts, however, have traditionally
been restricted by design from creating such equitable remedies
since the focus under the civilian system is solely on legislation
and custom, rather than the exercise of independent judicial
power.315 Mixed jurisdictions historically adhere to this civilian
approach in defining the proper role of their judges as well.316
In the 1970s, when Article 2 of the UCC was first promulgated,
a provision was included to finally codify the longstanding, judgemade doctrine of unconscionability.317 Section 2-302 makes a
specific grant of power to courts to police contracts that are
unconscionable.318 In doing so, it asks “whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of
the making of the contract.”319 The comments to the article mention
that this practice had been longstanding as a jurisprudential doctrine,
but that now it was being placed into statute and legislatively
sanctioned.320 Most UCC scholars attribute this endorsement as
being part of a larger response to the fact that standard-form
contracts—so notorious for their unevenness and overreaching
313. See id.
314. See generally S. F. C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW (2003); ROSCOE POUND, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE
COMMON LAW (2013); THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW (2010); John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835,
and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425 (1998).
315. See generally THOMAS J. SEMMES, HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA
AND OF THE CIVIL LAW (2010); PAUL BRAND, JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW (2012); JOHN MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PEREZ PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2007).
316. See H. Patrick Glenn, Mixing It Up, 78 TUL. L. REV. 79, 80–82 (2003);
see also C. A. Marvin, Dissents in Louisiana: Civility Among Civilians?, 58 LA.
L. REV. 975 (1998).
317. Brown, supra note 304.
318. Id.
319. See UCC § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2013).
320. See Hersbergen, supra note 244; UCC § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2013).
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provisions—had become so prolific as to constitute the majority of
all agreements entered into by private persons in the United
States.321 By putting the doctrine into statute, the drafters hoped to
lend some clarity, consistency, and stability to the otherwise
unwieldy and inconsistently (if not intellectually dishonestly)
applied doctrine.322
As of this writing, forty-eight American states have adopted
Section 2-302, with Louisiana and California being the only two that
have chosen not to incorporate the doctrine through legislation.323
However, since Section 2-302 contains so few specific directives on
how the unconscionability analysis should be applied, many courts
have adopted the two-part analysis that was first developed by the
noted American contract law scholar Professor Arthur Allen Leff.324
The first prong of Professor Leff’s test requires courts to
analyze the procedural aspects of the bargain, such as evidence of
oppression, lack of meaningful choice, an inability to read or
understand, lack of education, and a weak socio-economic
status.325 The second prong looks to the substantive aspects of the
contract such as the commercial reasonableness of the terms and
provisions of the contract itself, the allocation of risks, fair remedy
and penalty clauses, and an equitable cost-price balance.326
Nonetheless, courts have been varied as to how the prongs should
be used, with some requiring evidence of violations of both
procedural and substantive aspects, while others adopting a sliding
scale approach whereby more of one aspect can make up for a lack
of quantity in the other.327 The difficulty that common law courts
have had with fashioning an effective framework from which to
analyze unconscionability has been an issue that has plagued
Louisiana courts as well in their application of the doctrine.
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine
Although not having adopted Section 2-302—or any
meaningful amount of UCC Article 2 for that matter—Louisiana is
no stranger to unconscionability.328 The substance of the doctrine
has been variously employed by the judges of this mixed
jurisdiction to police contracts that they deem unfair or unjust even
321.
322.
1967).
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See Lonegrass, supra note 308.
See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856–57 (N.J.
Lonegrass, supra note 308.
Id. See also Leff, supra note 306.
Lonegrass, supra note 308, at 14–15.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17–18.
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though it was never specifically enacted into the Civil Code or
directly called as such by courts.329 This is chiefly done—much
like common law courts prior to codification—through utilizing
other existing concepts and institutions found in the Civil Code as
a mask for what is ultimately an exercise of the doctrine of
unconscionability. The first case to touch upon the concept was the
1890 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Lazarus v. McGuirk
where the court held that:
[A] judgment will be annulled when a party, having good
defenses to an action, is prevented from urging them by the
acts, promises, and representations of his adversary, in
which he trusted, and by reason thereof a judgment has
been rendered, which it is against good conscience to
execute.330
In Lazarus, the court discussed, in brief, its inherent
constitutional powers to regulate and control the way in which it
administered judgments. In making these declarations, the court
introduced the idea, through the lens of fraud, that certain
judgments could be denied or voided because of unconscionable
behavior by the parties.331 This early version of unconscionability
was later expanded to include judgments granted under
unconscionable circumstances involving rights in a succession.332
Over time, Louisiana courts have become somewhat more direct
in wielding (or threatening to wield) the doctrine of unconscionability
in those situations where a clause or agreement is deemed too harsh or
oppressive. For instance, in the case of Dennis Miller Pest Controls,
Inc. v. Wells, the court discussed the possibility of a liquidated
damages clause being “so exorbitant as to be unconscionable and

328. See Hersbergen, supra note 244, at 1318–19.
329. It should be noted that there is one specific place in Louisiana law
where unconscionability is specifically sanctioned. The Louisiana Consumer
Credit Law actually specifically endorses the use of unconscionability in
circumstances involving consumer credit transactions. See LA. REV. STAT. §
9:3551 (2009).
330. Lazarus v. McGuirk, 8 So. 253, 253 (La. 1890) (emphasis added).
331. Id.
332. See Succession of Gilmore, 102 So. 94, 95 (La. 1924) (“The courts of this
state will not hesitate to afford relief against judgments, irrespective of any issue
of inattention or neglect, when the circumstances under which the judgment is
rendered show the deprivation of legal rights of the litigant who seeks relief, and
when the enforcement of the judgment would be unconscientious and inequitable.
Our courts will follow the general principles of equity jurisprudence applied by
the equity courts of the other states of this country in actions of this character.”
(emphasis added)).
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will not, for equitable consideration, be invoked.”333 In an even
more direct decision, the intermediate appellate court in McKelvy
v. Milford declared a provision in a real estate listing agreement—
which provided that the realtor was entitled to her commission upon
the signing of a purchase agreement with a buyer, regardless of
whether the property was actually sold—to be “unconscionable.”334
In an effort to validate its exercise of such non-legislative power, the
McKelvy court cited a now-repealed Louisiana Civil Code article
that was based on Christian doctrine.335 The article proclaimed that
the quintessential rules of interpretation of contracts in Louisiana
were “founded in the Christian principle not to do unto others that
which we would not wish others should do unto us; and on the
moral maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the
expense of another.”336
Still, at other times Louisiana courts have been more subtle in
their endorsement of unconscionability and have only mentioned
their ability to police private agreements in passing dicta.337 For
example, the court in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Fell discussed
the potential, but did not make a determination, for voiding a
provision in a fidelity bond contract whereby the insured party was
prohibited from challenging the bonding party’s sole determination
regarding whether an indemnity payment was due.338 Also, in
Roberson v. C.W. Maris and J.H. Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. City
of Denham Springs, the courts discussed, but did not render a
judgment on, the notion that vague or overly broad provisions in a
construction or building contract could be deemed unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable.339
Although some might argue that the policing of contracts by
Louisiana courts is merely born from general civil law concepts of
good faith and meaningful consent, or that other doctrines such as
estoppel were really the tools at play, the language used by the
Louisiana courts in making these determinations seems much more
reminiscent of unconscionability.340 The phraseology of declaring
333. 320 So. 2d 590, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
334. 37 So. 2d 370, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1948).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 373 (citing former Louisiana Civil Code article 1965).
337. See Lama v. Manale, 50 So. 2d 15 (La. 1950) (Hamiter, J., dissenting);
La. Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson
v. Heller, 33 So. 2d 766 (La. Ct. App. 1948).
338. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Fell, 2 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App. 1941).
339. Roberson v. C.W. Maris, 266 So. 2d 488 (La. Ct. App. 1972); J.H.
Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. City of Denham Springs, 216 So. 2d 549 (La. Ct.
App. 1968).
340. See generally supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion.
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that a provision is “unconscionable” is not a term that has roots in
the civil law.341 However, it is an expression that has meaning and
a significant history at common law.342 This is particularly true
given the use of the phrase in connection with statements about
overreaching and undue power between private parties. Thus, it is
logical to conclude that its presence in Louisiana law could,
therefore, have derived from the common law.343 In many ways,
Louisiana courts are actually tracking the nomenclature of their
common law cousins in this regard.344 And in fact, the subtle
incorporation of the doctrine of unconscionability into Louisiana
jurisprudence is emblematic of the broader subconscious desire of
this mixed jurisdiction to incorporate legal concepts that are more
in line with the laws of the common law jurisdictions that surround
it.345 As individuals in other states have come to expect and
presume the ability of courts to police oppressive or unjust
contracts, Louisiana courts have dipped into the common law
waters and grafted such concepts—even if through seemingly
disingenuous ways—so as not to be viewed as out of step with
modern legal expectations.
C. Conflict Between the Two: Obsolescence and Opacity
Both lesion beyond moiety and unconscionability seek to right
wrongs and provide fairness between the parties where the court
deems that one party has been taken advantage of or has unduly
induced another to agree to something that a reasonable man would
not.346 In each case, the law seeks to step around and over the plain
words of the agreement and instill a certain level of extra-party
justice into the transaction.347
However, as noted above, these two doctrines are extremely
different.348 Unconscionability is broad in scope and category and
seeks to capture a seemingly endless array of circumstances and
341. See supra Part II.B.
342. See supra Part II.B.
343. See supra Part II.B.
344. See supra Part II.B; Golz v. Children’s Bureau, 326 So. 2d 865, 868
(La. 1976); Welch v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 677 So. 2d 520, 524 (La. Ct.
App. 1996); Caldwell Country Club v. Dep’t of Transp. and Dev., 438 So. 2d
723, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
345. See R. Fritz Niswanger, Comment, An Unconscionability Formula for
Louisiana Civilians?, 81 TUL. L. REV. 509 (2006).
346. See TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:15.
347. See generally Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics,
Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L.
& LIBERTY 470 (2007).
348. See supra Part II.A–B and accompanying discussion.
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agreements under which a party may be subject to the heavy hand or
undue manipulation of a party whose bargaining power is superior.349
Also, courts have wide latitude in utilizing their powers under this
doctrine because it lacks definite boundaries.350 For most of its
history, unconscionability has been viewed as an inherent power,
vested in courts under constitutional and fundamental legal
principles.351 Without a formal written structure to cage the judicial
analysis, the possibilities for unconscionability’s use are endless.352
And even with the advent of UCC Section 2-302 courts are still
left with great discretion as to when and how they may use the
concept to void or modify agreements.353 Since Section 2-302
contains so little guidance on the specifics of how the rule should
be implemented, many have argued that it merely enshrined into
law the general and broad principle that courts had already been
employing for centuries.354
Lesion, on the other hand, is a narrow and more limited
device.355 It too seeks to nominally protect the weak against the
heavy hand of the strong, but does so in a more restricted way.356
First, lesion is only available for sales of corporeal immovable
property.357 The sale of movable property, however valuable or
numerous, may not be rescinded for lesion, no matter how out of
proportion the price is compared to the value.358 This limitation is
rooted in the civil law’s historical views of real property being the
chief indicator of wealth.359 But this rationale also has its flaws.360
Today, movable property in the form of stocks, bonds, and other
financial instruments—not to mention the ever-growing realm of
virtual property such as social media accounts, mailing lists, and
other noncorporeal rights—are considered to have immense

349. See supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion.
350. See supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion.
351. See supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion.
352. See generally supra Part II.B and accompanying discussion.
353. Lonegrass, supra note 308, at 60.
354. Id.
355. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion.
356. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion.
357. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion.
358. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion.
359. See Odinet, supra note 80, at 1377.
360. See Christopher K. Odinet, Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9: The
Question of Tax Credit Collateral in Secured Transactions, 64 S.C. L. REV. 143
(2012) (discussing the rising value of corporeal and incorporeal movable
property).
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value.361 Further, lesion presupposes that meaningful manipulation
goes in only one direction—only the seller can invoke the right.362 A
buyer who is under undue pressure or is being oppressed or
manipulated by the seller to purchase property for a price that is out of
proportion to its value is without recourse.363 Despite changes in
modern life and views on different forms of property, Louisiana law
has not modified lesion to account for these changing expectations.364
The reason for the existence of these two similar but
inconsistent doctrines derives from the inherent struggle behind the
anchor effect. Louisiana has refused to adopt Article 2 of the UCC
because it was deemed to be too out of step and incompatible with
the state’s civil law scheme.365 And part of that involved
maintaining the ancient institution of lesion, which traces its roots
back to French and Roman law.366 To lose lesion would be to lose
a legal concept that has existed in Louisiana since its earliest
days.367 Such a loss would be repugnant to the mixed jurisdictional
sense of identity and tradition, even if its maintenance has ceased
to serve a useful purpose. But in that vein, Louisiana was not
willing to change and modify lesion to make it more in line with
unconscionability or to expand its scope to encompass a wider
array of scenarios and types of transactions. And this is true despite
the fact that many civilian jurisdictions such as Switzerland,
Austria, Germany, and particularly Quebec have done so.368
As the economy has become more regional and national in
scale and scope, the common law waves have come crashing hard
on the shores of the Louisiana civil law island.369 The expectations
of the everyday man presupposes that if an agreement is so harsh
and unjust, and his position is so weak—because of education,
361. See id.; Sally Brown Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property in
Community Property Regimes: Are My Facebook Friends Considered Earnings,
Profits, Increases in Value, or Goodwill?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 717 (2011).
362. See supra Part II.A.
363. Id.
364. See id.
365. See La. Lift & Equip., Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
366. See supra Part II.A.
367. See supra Part II.A.
368. Some civil law countries have amended their version of lesion to
broaden its scope. For example, the Austrian Civil Code allows rescission for
the sale of movables as well. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
[ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] 934 (Austria); see also Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991,
c. 64 art. 1406 (Can.); CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [CO] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS]
Mar. 30, 1911, art. 21 (Switz); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL
CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, § 138, para. 2 (Ger.); CODICE
CIVILE [C.C.] art. 1448 (It.).
369. See supra Part II.B.
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status, position, or wealth—so as to render him wholly incapable
of meaningfully and knowingly entering into the agreement, that a
court may employ powers of equity and justice to remediate unjust
enforcement.370
This is particularly true since the 2007–2008 economic crisis and
the advent of stronger consumer protection laws,371 both at the state
and federal level in the United States and abroad, which have brought
the concept of fairness and equity in private agreements (particularly
in standard form agreements) into the limelight of political
discourse.372 Over time and in the face of such expectations,
Louisiana courts have had no choice but to splice the common law,
UCC concept of unconscionability into state law in such a way as to
avoid a wholesale adoption—which would offend civilian principles—
but still enable enforcement and tacit recognition of the doctrine.373
Unfortunately, its disguised implementation has logically drowned
out the need for lesion and, because of unconscionability’s wide
scope, the doctrine has washed away some of the historical gilt that
has characterized lesion, thus revealing its many limitations and
weaknesses in the modern world.
Under these circumstances, the result has been Louisiana’s
maintenance of an institution that is out of step with modern life and
the economic and social realities of the day.374 It has further
occasioned the judicial embracing of a concept that the state’s
legislature has heretofore refused to adopt in order to further the
state’s ability to compete in the integrated, cross-border economy.375
However, both concepts at their core seek to accomplish the same
goal, but one is so steeped in history and tradition that it fails to
face the realities of a changing world, while the other is so broad
and unmanageable that it causes uncertainty.376 By not specifically
recognizing unconscionability, Louisiana jurisprudence on the
issue is left in disorder and lacks coherent and consistent
parameters, which in turn makes the realm of possibilities for its
application both endless and unpredictable.377
370. Lonegrass, supra note 308.
371. See Amy J. Schmitz, Sex Matters: Considering Gender in Consumer
Contracting, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 437 (2013).
372. See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State
Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893
(2011); Todd J. Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or
Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013).
373. See supra Part II.B.
374. See supra Part II.A.
375. See supra Part II.B.
376. See supra Part II.A.
377. See supra Part II.B.
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Thus results the anchor effect in Louisiana contract law. With
redhibition and fitness, the anchor effect has resulted in two
institutions that overlap and become conflated with one another to
such a degree that both lose much of their potency.378 But with
lesion and unconscionability, the anchoring effect has resulted in
the existence of two separate institutions with the same goals, but
with wholly different and inconsistent approaches.379 Until this
disjointed legal arrangement is recognized and corrected, each of
these concepts will continue to exist in an effort to provide justice
and fairness in contracting, but neither doing so in an efficient or
truly effective way.380
IV. THE ANCHOR EFFECT IN CONTEXT: A SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
As described above, the anchor effect is caused by the retaining
of existing civil law institutions alongside the incorporation of new
common law concepts, and this has resulted in an array of negative
consequences to Louisiana’s bijural legal regime.381 In seeking to
further understand the causes behind the anchor effect, after having
explored its various instances, it is important to consider the
psychology of what underpins Louisiana’s intrinsic inclination to
cling somewhat inflexibly to established civil law institutions when
engaging in legal reform. By understanding this psychology, one is
able to understand the unique and particular social science nuances
that motivate legal reform in all mixed jurisdictions.
This anchoring is rooted in more than a sheer appreciation for
history or an aversion to change. Both assertions are too simplistic
and suggest that the anchor effect is caused merely by a casual
affinity for the familiar and the known. In fact, social scientists
have long argued against the overly basic yet widely held truism
that people generally resist change.382 This statement has been
described as being overly one-dimensional in that it fails to
recognize the many situations in which change is welcomed and
even embraced.383 For instance, people rarely ever resist an
increase in pay, the chance to work on a project which they find
stimulating, or an increase in the amount of resources or tools
378. See supra Part I.
379. See supra Part II.
380. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
381. See supra Parts III–IV.
382. See John C. Bruckman, Overcoming Resistance to Change: Causal
Factors, Interventions, and Critical Values, 11 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J. 211
(2008).
383. See id.
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available to accomplish a given task.384 All of these involve a
change, but few—if any—individuals are opposed to them.385 A
more complex understanding of society’s resistance to change, as
well as how tradition and history play a part in decision-making
processes, is essential to giving full consideration to the deeprooted psychology and sociology of how the anchor effect has
come to exist and operate in America’s sole mixed jurisdiction
and, by extension, in all mixed jurisdictions.386
A. Self-Preservation and the Resistance to Change
Of fundamental importance to understanding why the legal
reforms described above have been subject to such subconscious
resistance, one must understand what lies behind this struggle.387 In
the context of the anchor effect it is necessary to look at what
specific factors underlie efforts to maintain existing civil law
institutions even in the face of incorporating new and/or conflicting
legal devices.388
Social science literature gives some insight into this inquiry.
First, in general, change threatens the status quo.389 In Louisiana,
like all mixed jurisdictions, the civil law system of private law has
existed for hundreds of years and is both widely familiar and
known to the state’s inhabitants.390 Accordingly, there is a natural
inclination to maintain the current state of affairs because such
familiarity brings with it the ability to confidently and comfortably
navigate the legal system.391 After a given community first
becomes comfortable with a scheme of laws, the emphasis subtly
shifts to keeping those laws in place so as to ensure stability and
permanence.392
Additionally, change is further resisted because it calls into
question self-confidence and one’s personal ability to perform.393
As generations of Louisiana lawyers and jurists have gained and
honed their skills under the existing civil law system, the
384. See id.
385. Id.
386. See id.; E. Dent & E. Prowley, Employees Actually Embrace Change:
The Chimera of Resistance, 7 J. APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 56
(2001).
387. See Bruckman, supra note 382, at 211–19.
388. See supra Parts I–III.
389. See Bruckman, supra note 382, at 211–19.
390. See supra Parts I–III.
391. See Bruckman, supra note 382, at 211–19.
392. Id.
393. Id.
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incorporation of an entirely new structure and the abandonment of
the old calls into question continued viability. As the adage goes,
“can you teach an old dog new tricks”?394 Can, or will, parties who
are so intimately familiar and content with a given scheme become
successfully acclimated to an entirely new structure? Thus, a
psychological element of self-preservation pervades the legal
reforms described above because the incorporation of new
concepts necessarily requires the need to learn and become
proficient in new rules and procedures.395 As new legal devices are
incorporated from the common law and other uniform law sources,
a natural tension is created between feelings of familiarity and
anxiety about learning new rules.396
Further, change is resisted because, at a fundamental level, it
calls into question how a given group understands and makes sense
of the world.397 The structures that a society builds around it—
including its legal system—reflect a given set of values and
norms.398 They are honed over time to be an extension of the
culture, principles, and attitudes of the place.399 Louisiana’s civil
law structure can be said to follow this same theory. Legal reform
of this system, however necessary, brings about a tacit
acknowledgement that things can be done a better way or that the
current set of rules are inadequate.400
Although some reforms may bring about only small or singular
changes in a given institution, it is the psychology of that change
rather than the substance that can trigger a need for selfjustification and defensive reasoning.401 It is also true that within
the decision-making body there may be distrust among the
members as to those leaders championing the reform—as seen
through the introduction of the common law by the congressionally
appointed governor William Claiborne in Louisiana’s early days of
statehood.402 This mistrust can stem from a different understanding
or assessment of the circumstances calling for the reform, as well
394. Although of unknown origins, the proverb is widely used. See Joseph F.
Falcone III & Daniel Utain, You Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The
Application of Common Law in Present-Day Environmental Disputes, 11 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 59 (2000); Celia R. Taylor, Capital Market Development in the
Emerging Markets: Time to Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 71 (1997).
395. See Bruckman, supra note 382.
396. See supra Parts I–III.
397. See Bruckman, supra note 382.
398. See id.
399. See id. (citing SUZANNE SAMUELS, LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (2005)).
400. See Bruckman, supra note 382.
401. See generally id. at 212.
402. See id.
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as an innate desire to defend established social relations that are
perceived as being under threat.403 Lastly, groups associate change
with stress.404 This stress impacts not only personal feelings and
emotions, but also organizational behaviors.405 As an existing
institution gives way to another, subconscious feelings of anxiety
are sparked, as there becomes a need to understand and assimilate
oneself to a new order.406
B. History and Tradition in Decision-Making
However, it is not enough to simply acknowledge that certain
changes cause anxiety, fear, stress, and other attendant ills.407 The
anchor effect is caused by more than just the methodical, everyday symptoms that come with change.408 Rather, it is the distinct
and palpable force of tradition and history that makes this mixed
jurisdiction’s struggle with legal reform all the more tumultuous.409
Specifically, fidelity to the state’s legal history and tradition is
what makes the clash against legal change and reform so
arduous.410
In general, the literature often describes tradition as being
“equated with manners and morals of our past, with our origins
(genesis) and roots, and with our explanation of the present moment
as a continuum of historical forces through time.”411 Louisiana’s
civil law tradition very much follows this characterization.412
Because it chiefly represents the area of the law that governs the
rights, duties, and obligations of private parties, it, in essence,
symbolizes feelings about social interaction and interrelational
obligations.413 The morals of the family, the rights of the consumer,
the stability of transactions, and the safeguard of property are all
intimately derived from Louisiana’s ancient civil law tradition.414
403. See id.
404. See id. at 213.
405. See id.
406. Id.
407. See supra Part VI.A.
408. See supra Parts I–III.
409. See supra Parts I–III.
410. See supra INTRODUCTION and accompanying discussion.
411. See Sura P. Rath, What Would Said Say: Reflections on Tradition,
Imperialism, and Globalism, 24 SOC. TEXT 87, 21–22 (2006).
412. See generally THOMAS J. SEMMES, HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF
LOUISIANA AND OF THE CIVIL LAW (2010).
413. See id.
414. See generally Roger K. Ward, Bijuralism as an Assimilation Tool: Lord
Durham’s Assessment of the Louisiana Legal System, 63 LA. L. REV. 1127
(2003).
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Not only this, but because of its long-standing and historical nature,
this legal system links many Louisianans to their ancestry, conjuring
up images of immigrants, pioneers, and early settlers and the laws
and traditions that governed and protected them over the course of
many generations.415
And, rightly so, tradition should be protected and preserved.
The wide-scale demand for mass-market uniformity—particularly
in the quest to enact uniform laws—can often serve as a death
knell to distinctive legal institutions that are not only historically
significant, but also fulfill unique needs and purposes that are
idiosyncratically tied to people and place.416 Mixed jurisdictions
are often described as melting pots, brimming with cultures and
value systems that are drawn over many centuries and from across
different regions.417 In the case of Louisiana, this “multiculturalism
supports the preservation of differences among people of diverse
cultures rather than urging them to replace their []identities with
one single ‘American’ identity.”418 Similarly, the history and
background of such mixed jurisdictions are also worthy of
preservation because of the way in which they have helped to
define many features of the state and its people.
And, as might be expected, tradition, being of such chief
societal importance, plays a powerful role in decision-making.419
Groups chart their future through the “shared recognition of local
character and tradition,” and these elements help shape subsequent
decisions about that future.420 This form of mutual recognition has
been shown to have a heavy influence on law and policy-making
such as, for example, how local culture has dictated decisions on
land-use, zoning, and development decisions.421 Such is the case
with Louisiana’s efforts at legal reform discussed above. Although
there is often a strong desire to harmonize the law with other
jurisdictions and create a legal environment that is both competitive
and mainstream, decision-making regarding how this is accomplished
is very much tied to feelings of tradition and the preservation of
415. See generally LIGHT TOWNSEND CUMMINS, JUDITH KELLEHER
SCHAFER, EDWARD F. HAAS, & MICHAEL L. KURTZ, LOUISIANA: A HISTORY
(2008); see also ANNE CAMPBELL & WILSON A. MARSTON, LOUISIANA: THE
HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN STATE (1999).
416. See Rath, supra note 411, at 25.
417. See, e.g., Rea L. Holmes, How Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Failed
Displaced New Orleans Voters, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 75, 76 (2006).
418. GILBERT MULLER & HARVEY S. WIENER, THE SHORT PROSE READER
(11th ed. 1981).
419. See Gary Alan Fine, The Sociology of the Local: Action and Its Publics,
28 SOC. THEORY 355, 365 (2010).
420. See id.
421. See id.
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identity.422 It is through an honest recognition that a collective
selfhood of the past is being incorporated into the decision-making of
the present that Louisiana’s decision makers and the decision makers
in other mixed jurisdictions are able to address the causes and
negative consequences of the anchor effect.423
C. Forging a Usable Past
These many elements that contribute to society’s resistance to
change, as well as the effects of Louisiana’s strong attachment to
its legal history and tradition, are exemplified in the anchor effect.
There is a subconscious policy choice made during the legal
reform process that existing institutions—which are symbolic of
established and existing social structures and long-held selfidentifying traditions—should be maintained to help temper and
blunt the perceived harshness, anxiety, and stress that comes with
change. Social science research expounds on this very point: that
“[p]eople make choices, self-consciously or not” that are
“outgrowths of the psychic underbrush” and such choices are
shaped by the historical forces of “shared experiences or [the]
background knowledge of participants.”424 “No matter how much
we emphasize the here-and-now, a self-referential history sets the
terms for negotiations.”425
As described in this Article, the choices that are involved in
engaging in legal reform—whether by the legislature or the courts—
so deeply informed by history and tradition, can sometimes lead to
negative consequences, but such consequences are made more
difficult to acknowledge because of the powerful and subconscious
sociological desire to resist that change. This emphasizes the need
for legal reformers in mixed jurisdictions—which have such a
unique and historical tie to their own laws and legal institutions—to
be frank and self-conscious in acknowledging the historical legal
culture of the place when enacting reforms so that these traditions
can be clearly managed and built upon to create a foundation for a
new set of priorities and values. Mixed jurisdictions, like all
societies, are charged with forging a “usable past” that stands not
as a barrier to change and reform, but as an impetus for frequent
self-examination.426 In the context of the anchor effect, the use of
tradition through the lens of self-reflection ensures that mixed
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 359.
See id.
See id.
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jurisdictions avoid being trapped in the patterns of their past and,
rather, engage in the creative endeavor of creating new institutions
and adjusting the old so as to meet the needs of the present.427
CONCLUSION
Change is inevitable. It is needed to bring progress, to develop,
to grow, and to advance. Change also brings the unforeseen, the
uncertain, and the untested. Change is particularly difficult because
it inherently means that something must be left behind to make
room for something new. And most of all, a wise discernment is
required to determine when change is unnecessary.
Mixed jurisdictions are exceptionally susceptible to this
internal struggle that comes with change because of their unique
status as civil law states or countries that are surrounded by other
jurisdictions or systems that are dominated by the common law.428
For Louisiana, this dichotomy is the source of a host of issues.
Having to learn or adjust to a new system and a new set of rules
when doing business or operating in Louisiana, as opposed to any
other state, can cause frustration, confusion, or, at worst, a
complete rejection of engaging with the state altogether. In a time
when competition between states for economic development
projects, business investments, and highly skilled jobs and
professionals is greater than ever, the potential for such a negative
perception or complete rejection has garnered significant attention
from Louisiana’s leaders.429
In an effort to keep pace with its neighbors and to diminish the
image of a state where “things are done differently,” Louisiana has
incorporated mainstream and national legal concepts into its
law.430 These have come either through judicial adoption or
through direct legislation.431 They involve embracing either
concepts directly from common law cases or borrowing from
institutions that have been created through national efforts to
427. See id.
428. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 7.
429. For a discussion of state legal competition, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443–1510 (1992).
430. See generally Bret Schulte, A Troubling Bayou Tradition, U.S. NEWS (Oct.
2, 2005), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051010/10louisiana.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/DP6B-L4R4; Howard Witt, Most Corrupt State:
Louisiana Ranked Higher Than Illinois, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2009)
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-corruption-louisiana_wittmar27-story.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/9XX9-ST7X; see also supra Parts I–III and
accompanying discussion.
431. See supra Parts I–III.
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implement uniform laws.432 Nonetheless, these foreign institutions
are often fastened to the state’s legal landscape even when the
horizon is already populated with existing institutions that purport
to cover the same topic.433 These existing institutions are derived
from Louisiana’s long-standing civil law tradition.434 This civilian
tradition, so prized and favored, holds a special, almost sacred,
place among Louisiana’s legal community.435 To jettison these
altogether would be a betrayal of the past and an abdication of a
responsibility that has been passed down in the legal community of
this mixed jurisdiction since the days of James Brown, Louis
Moreau Lislet, and the drafters of the 1806 manifesto during
Louisiana’s early years of statehood.436
Yet, what has resulted from this dual system of laws is an
anchoring effect.437 A phenomena whereby incorporating new and
foreign legal concepts into the law in an effort to become more
competitive and mainstream, while at the same time maintaining
longstanding and traditional civil law institutions—with both
covering approximately the same subject matter or area—Louisiana
law has actually become less progressive, less competitive, and less
true to its roots.438 And of this dual system so created, the laws
governing sale warranties and contractual fairness provide
particularly potent examples of the negative consequences that can
result.
The time has come for Louisiana, and perhaps, by extension,
other similarly situated mixed jurisdictions, to acknowledge and
understand the anchor effect and its negative consequences. By
mooring the law to historical institutions that no longer serve
contemporary needs, competitive desires are frustrated.439 Similarly,
by incorporating new common law or uniform law concepts, but not
adopting them fully or by introducing them but keeping similar
and/or conflicting civil law institutions in place, the law as a whole
432. See supra Parts I–III.
433. See supra Parts I–III.
434. See supra Parts I–III.
435. See supra Parts I–III.
436. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003). See also ALAIN
A. LEVASSEUR & LOUIS CASMIR ELIZABETH, MOREAU LISLET: FOSTER FATHER
OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW (1996); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM:
LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1999); A.N. Yiannopoulos,
Requiem for a Civil Code: A Comparative Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379 (2003).
437. See supra Parts I–III.
438. See supra Parts I–III.
439. See supra Parts I–III.
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becomes less clear and a proper analysis of these institutions can
become confusing or impossible.440
A respect and reverence for history and tradition is essential.441
The civil law aspects of all mixed jurisdictions are important and
should be protected and preserved. As such, there are many
instances where an existing civil law institution is superior to and
far more effective than a mainstream or popular uniform or
common law concept. A part of respecting and preserving
traditional legal institutions involves acknowledging when they
prove to be superior to competing frameworks. When such is the
case, the existing institution should be maintained and honed,
rather than abdicated in favor of what is new or fashionable.
Neglecting to act in such a manner by being clear, thoughtful, and
honest when engaging in legal reform serves only to further isolate
mixed jurisdictions on their civil law islands.442
In the event lawmakers of mixed jurisdictions feel it is in their
jurisdiction’s best interest to wade into the common law waters, they
must do so with confidence and they must be deliberate in their
steps.443 Each foreign legal concept that is adopted must be carefully
and honestly evaluated to determine whether it meets the needs and
goals of the locale.444 This analysis must be accompanied by a
candid appraisal of any current civil law institutions that could
conflict with, serve the same goals as, or occupy the same area as
the new concept.445 If the new concept is superior, then the civil law
institution must be let go and allowed to float adrift.446 However, if
it is determined that the civil law concept is superior, then it should
be clearly maintained, and any appropriate modifications should be
made.447 A foreign legal concept, merely because it is mainstream,
should not be adopted—however enticing or popular such an
adoption might be—if it does not clearly prove to be more useful
and effective than what is already in place.448
These types of decisions during the law reform process are
often difficult. They can give birth to much internal struggle about
the true goals and objectives of a particular jurisdiction, as well as
how best to meet the mandates of a competitive economy and the
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
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modern expectations of a demanding society.449 Nevertheless, such
challenging decisions must be made so that mixed jurisdictions do
not find themselves anchored to the past, and so that they may
confidently, deliberately, and effectively set their sails toward the
future.450

449. See supra Parts I–III.
450. See supra Parts I–III.

